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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY INTEREST? A PREFACE
Despite its complexities, inconsistencies, and somewhat chaotic
development, the international income tax regime (IITR) has never
fulfilled the fire and brimstone prophecies many claimed it would.
Imposing only insignificant barriers to trade and investment, the IITR
has allowed international commerce among industrialized countries
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1

with inconsequential incidences of double taxation. Because it is
premised on the “source rules,” which allocate revenue from different
economic activities to different jurisdictions, it is surprising that the
IITR has never been fundamentally challenged. These rules are
convoluted, detached from the economic concept of income, and
2
devoid of any well theorized normative content. To unfold this
apparent inconsistency — between the IITR’s smooth operation and
blemished source premise — this article reviews critically the
economic and intellectual history of one of the IITR’s most important
sourcing conventions: the source tax treatment of interest payments.
Allocation of interest income has always been an important issue
because of the business community’s interest in preventing tax
obstacles from interfering with the “smooth” flow of international
debt investments. Despite its ongoing importance for both capital
importing and exporting countries, sourcing rules dealing with interest
have been somewhat ambiguous as to the tax owed by the creditor to
the debtor’s jurisdiction. Even though they have elicited numerous
controversies, these ambiguities have not been fully resolved during
the course of the last eighty-five years. One aspect of the article’s
contribution is focusing on the very significant interest source rules
and tracing their development over a long period of time. However,
its main contribution transcends the importance of the interest source
rules. Due to their ongoing importance and ambiguity, the sourcing
conventions of interest income have been constantly changed through
the years, each change subscribing to the different ideological premise
of its era. Accordingly, the development of these sourcing conventions
serves as an example that reflects the IITR’s development as a whole.
The article traces the historical development of the IITR — a
synthesis of two more commonly told 20th century historic processes.
The first is the history of globalization — a process induced by
Western countries to restore the high pre-WWI levels of market
integration. The second is the history of the income tax — and the
reliance of Western countries on income tax revenues since WWI. The
source rules are the friction point between these two stories. The
economic concept of income refers to the net increase in individuals’
wealth during a given period, pooling individuals’ resources to
1

Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 269 (2001).
2
H. David Rosenbloom, U.S. Source Rules: Building Blocks of Cross-Border
Taxation, 60 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 386 (2006) (providing an
illuminating analysis over the function of the source rules in the international income
tax regime (IITR)).
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determine their ability to bear the tax burden. In contrast, the source
rules bifurcate individuals’ income to different jurisdictions, hence
importing a divisional element into income tax administration that is
alien to the notion of income as the net gain of individuals’ total
3
wealth. The growing levels of economic integration in global markets
require increasingly the use of source rules, hence making the tension
between the notion of income tax and globalization palpable and
inevitable. This article provides readers with an insight into the
dynamics by which many international source tax rules and
conventions have developed. IITR policy is an extension of foreign
policy and fiscal policy, each representing a compromise among
multiple considerations. Because of this, the development of IITR
policy has always been perceived as somewhat erratic and
4
discontinuous. As a result, with only few exceptions, it has never been
adequately researched and theorized.
The article demonstrates that an erratic vision is flawed, and that
one may track dominant themes underlying the IITR’s development.
The article demonstrates how, over the past eighty-five years, these
themes were subject to changes that corresponded with the political
economy of cross-border businesses and transactions. To illustrate
this, it creates three novel chronological stages of development: the
Revenue, Trade, and Anti-Avoidance Phases. In each of these phases,
the article focuses on the major crossroads in the development of U.S.
sourcing rules in the U.S. IITR that, due to the dominant economic
position of the United States, are the most influential IITR in the
examined era. The article examines U.S. sourcing rules by looking at
two different elements that developed in different phases. The first is
U.S. double taxation treaty policy and its resonance with other
significant treaty policies of international organizations with regard to
withholding taxes on interest payments. The second element is the
U.S. earnings-stripping regime (USESR).
The upshot of the article’s historical analysis transcends the value
of elucidating this specific issue alone. It highlights a more general and
multilayered story of source tax erosion that has not yet been told.
3

Jugh J. Ault & David F. Brandford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis
of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 31 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemord eds., 1990).
4
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313 (2005); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M.
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021
(1997); Richard Vann, Tax Treaties: The Secret Agent’s Secrets, 50 BRIT. TAX REV. 345
(2006).
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The thesis that emerges is that the themes that have dominated the
IITR debate are fundamentally insufficient for dealing with material
changes in an integrated global economy. More specifically, the article
argues that fiscal and equitable considerations played too small a role
in the development of the IITR. The article suggests that notions of
liberalizing cross-border trade and investment have infiltrated the
debate in an unbalanced and hazardous way, leading to a severe
erosion of the income tax base. It further argues that the antiavoidance strategy, which sought to balance trade considerations by
re-characterizing transactions that might be identified as abusive, was
unable to prevent fiscal losses, resulting in immense costs and
inefficiencies. In my opinion, such paradigmatic failures explain the
present IITR’s inadequate performance at the outset of the 21st
century. One cannot underestimate the impact of this failure because,
5
as the 21st century begins, residence income taxation is under siege.
There is a growing readiness among policymakers in dominant
economies to shift to a territorial system that exempts residents’
foreign income. This suggests that whether or not one believes that
taxation at source is justified, the source rules are the de facto arena in
6
which many future tax battles are going to be won or lost.
The article provides an historical analysis that is necessary for
better informed policy research. It urges scholars and policymakers to
create a new phase in IITR development that contains new source
allocation conventions. It argues that, based on material changes in
the world economy and the inadequacy of current sourcing rules to
efficiently and equitably deal with the proceeds of financial
investments, the sourcing rules of an emerging new phase will have to
depart from prevalent source rule classifications of financial
investments.
Part II of the article contextualizes the tax environment in which
financial transactions are employed. It does so by exploring the legal
and economic terrain in which such transactions take place.
Afterwards, it carefully defines the scope of the article’s inquiry. Part
III describes the first phase in the intellectual development of the
IITR — the Revenue Phase. During this phase, from the 1920s until
the end of WWII, revenue considerations played the major role in
IITR formulation. As the article later argues, it is surprising to see

5

Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the ‘Unsourceable’: The Cost Sharing Regulations
and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangibles-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631,
633–35 (2007).
6
Id.
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such revenue considerations abandoned in years to come. Part IV
details the rationales behind the second phase — the Trade Phase. It
examines the manner through which double taxation treaties
(Treaties) and unilateral exemptions eroded U.S. withholding taxes
on interest from inbound debt investments — investments made by
nonresidents in the (domestic) source jurisdiction — to promote free
trade objectives during the Cold War era. The article argues that such
rationales severely impaired the U.S. IITR from effectively and
equitably levying source taxation on inbound debt investments. Part V
discusses the 1990s Anti-Avoidance Phase, which was the knee-jerk
reaction to the hegemony of trade and investment considerations
during the Trade Phase. The article highlights the premises of this
phase, and their underlying problems, through an in depth analysis of
the earnings-stripping tax abuse and the paradigm of earningsstripping regimes designed to counter it. Part VI uses the USESR as a
case-study to assess critically whether the anti-avoidance paradigm
met any of its feasible objectives. The article contends that the
USESR’s failure is directly derived from the tottery foundations of
the Anti-Avoidance Phase and, as such, is reflective of a more
profound systemic failure in the IITR. Part VII presents the epilogue
of the analyzed historic processes and a concise prologue to how
interest sourcing rules should develop in the future. This Part stresses
that the article is the first part of a broader research enterprise dealing
with formulating a concrete sourcing paradigm for financial
transactions within multinational enterprises (MNE or MNEs, as
appropriate). It further suggests that the article’s historical analysis
lays out a set of underlying principles that may serve as a platform for
future reforming of the IITR. Part VIII provides the article’s
conclusions.
II. THE TAXATION OF DEBT INVESTMENT: THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT
A. The Law and Economics of Inbound Debt Investments
This Part explains the basic attributes of the (current) interest
sourcing rules and conventions in preparation for the next Parts,
which analyze the dynamics by which they were created. Although
much of the article’s discussion is relevant outside the corporate
framework, since international commerce is overwhelmingly
7
conducted by corporations, the article limits its analysis to them. It
7

Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International
Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 131 (2001).
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nevertheless refrains from addressing the possible implications of
8
corporate shareholders’ imputation tax regimes on the analysis.
Everyone agrees that the source jurisdiction (where the income is
formed through the productive activity of tangible and intangible
assets, human capital, and capital investments) has the right to levy
corporate tax before the residence jurisdiction (where the individual
9
or corporate investor resides). This, however, is merely a formal
recognition in the case of interest income, since the source priority
does not provide source jurisdictions with a tangible capability to raise
revenues from it.
There are two relevant types of source taxes on foreign corporate
investments — the corporate income tax and withholding taxes.
Corporate tax is laid on the (net) taxable income of a corporate
10
entity. If the corporation derives income from domestic and foreign
sources, the corporate tax is applied both as a source tax (on the
income raised by the domestic operations) and as a residency tax (on
income generated abroad). In the context of this article, which deals
primarily with source taxes, the analysis refers to the corporate tax
mainly as a source tax. In contrast, withholding taxes are laid on
different types of payments (e.g., dividends, royalties, and interest)
made by domestic taxpayers to foreign investors and trading partners.
Thus, withholding taxes are laid on sources of gross income and not
upon (net) taxable income. This division of the source taxing right,
reflected in the principles governing treaties, relies on the structure of
the classical corporate tax system, which enshrines a distinct tax law
11
treatment of investors and corporations. Accordingly, setting aside
issues of tax incidence, while the corporate income tax (when it is
imposed as a source tax and not as a residency tax) is a tax on

8

This is partly because, with the exception of the European Union (EU), which
for the time being is a unique political arrangement, imputation tax regimes do not
typically grant any corporate tax relief to foreigners.
9
Stephen E. Shay, Jr. et al., “What’s Source Got to Do With It?” Source Rules
and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83 (2002). The residence’s
entitlement is always secondary in the sense that if levied, it offers some type of relief
to taxes paid in the source jurisdiction. One can argue that this concurrence is not the
byproduct of a normative recognition of the source regime’s entitlement to levy tax
first but a byproduct of the practice in which source recognition can take the first tax
bite.
10
The corporation’s net taxable income equals its gross income (profits) minus
its expenses.
11
Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 565 (1992).
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business, withholding taxes are perceived as taxes on foreign investors
(e.g., shareholders and creditors).
The following graphic schema (Figure 1) illustrates how these
concepts interplay. Assume, for example, there is a corporation that is
a tax resident of Country A. It has its headquarters located in Country
A and a foreign branch in Country B. In a given year the corporation
earned $150 from its business activities in Country A and $100 from
its business activities in Country B (both figures represent taxable
income before taxes). In this example, Country B is solely a source
jurisdiction; therefore, it lays its corporate tax (as a source tax) on the
$100 earned by the corporation in it. Country A is both a source and a
residence jurisdiction; therefore, it lays its corporate tax on the entire
$250 earned by the corporation in that year. Country A’s corporate
tax is laid, as a source tax, on the $150 earned by the corporation in its
jurisdiction and as residence tax on the foreign sourced income earned
by the corporation’s foreign branch in Country B. To avoid double
taxation, Country A, the residence jurisdiction, will typically grant the
corporation tax credits for the corporate income taxes it pays abroad
in the source jurisdiction (Country B in our case). All corporate
income taxes are laid on taxable income (before taxes) — so if the
corporation had been losing money, it would not be exposed to the
taxes.
Withholding taxes are laid by the source country on gross income
payments. In the above example assume that the corporation’s
headquarters (located in Country A) took a loan from an unrelated
lender in Country C and the foreign branch (in Country B) leased
some intellectual property rights from it. In a given year, the
corporation’s headquarters and foreign branch had to pay USD 20
interest and $50 royalty payments to the unrelated party, respectively.
In this case, Countries A and B could lay withholding taxes on those
payments. These taxes, which are nominally imposed on the unrelated
party from Country C, are not “real” income taxes since they would
have to be paid even if overall the unrelated party incurs losses in a
given year and therefore has no economic income.
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FIGURE 1. A TAXONOMY OF THE IITR TAXES
Country A

Country C

(source & residence
Jurisdiction)
Headquarters:
$(+150)
taxable income

$20

Unrelated
party:
$(-100)
taxable income

Interest / royalty (gross
income payments) subject to
withholding taxes*

Foreign
branch:
$(+100)
taxable
income

Net income subject to corporate tax:
Country A:
$250 worldwide/residence
income subject comprised
of two components (each
subject to corporate tax).
$150 on domestically
sourced income subject to
corporate tax - as a source
tax
$100 foreign sourced
income of the branch
subject to A’s corporate
tax – as a residence tax.
Country B:
$100 source income
subject to source corporate
tax.

$50

Country B
(source jurisdiction)

Payments to unrelated party in C**
subject to source withholding taxes:
Country A:
$20 subject to A’s
withholding taxes.
Country B:
$50 subject to B’s
withholding taxes.

* Withholding taxes may also be laid on dividend payments. Additionally, they will also be laid
upon interest and royalty payments made from a foreign subsidiary to its parent.
** The withholding taxes are levied on gross income payments and thus are imposed even
though the unrelated party in Country C has a net income loss in the taxable year in which it is
receiving the payments.

Legally, source supremacy is limited solely by a sovereign’s
undertaken treaty obligations for reciprocity and nondiscrimination
12
towards the residents of the other signatory. However, in reality, the
actual division of a sovereign’s right to tax most frequently adheres to
a more refined convention. This convention differentiates between the
source jurisdiction’s unchallenged primacy to tax active business
income and its (de facto) weaker claim on taxing passive (investment)
13
income generated from foreign capital invested in its jurisdiction.
The source country retains its corporate tax rate and base when
dealing with the taxable income derived by subsidiaries of foreign
corporations in its jurisdiction. In contrast, it only has the ability to
14
impose low withholding taxes on deductible payments (and also on
12

See sections 871(b), 882(a), and 884, which impose a relatively high 30%
withholding tax rate on a wide array of payments made by U.S. residents to
nonresidents. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a), 884.
13
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1996).
14
Ault, supra note 11, at 566, 573 (noting that this principle is most notably
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15

nondeductible dividend payments). Source jurisdictions’ ability to
impose withholding taxes is therefore mere lip service to the notion of
source supremacy. For example, federal statutory law prescribes that
every interest payment made to nonresidents that is not effectively
connected with a trade or business in the United States is subject to a
16
statutory withholding tax rate of 30%. However, as will be
demonstrated later in detail, the encompassing nature of the
exemptions to this rule makes the exceptions the de facto rule of the
land.
The fact that withholding taxes are mostly recognized by their
effective erosion suggests that the source jurisdiction’s desire to levy
taxes is typically reconciled with the broader international consensus
that passive income should be taxed primarily in the residence
17
jurisdiction. Startlingly, this artificial division of source taxing rights
has by and large been left unchallenged. Perhaps because of deemed
truisms regarding the distinctness of corporate-versus-shareholder tax
treatments, the debate over sourcing practices has neglected using a
combined analysis of the two taxes to determine the appropriateness
18
of source tax practices.
The present article explores how the source tax base has been
eroded both on the withholding tax level (Part IV) and on the
corporate tax level (Part VI). It is important to recognize that this
leniency in a source tax jurisdiction’s tax bite has not been tantamount
to a stronger fiscal grasp of the residence jurisdiction. Rather, the
dynamics described below, which led to erosion of the source tax base,
took place as residency taxation was eroded as well.

followed with respect to income derived from portfolio investments).
15
Richard L. Umbrecht & Don W. Llewellyn, Planning Pitfalls and
Opportunities for Foreign Owned Corporations Under the Earnings Stripping Rules,
47 TAX LAW. 641, 646 (1994).
16
I.R.C. §§ 861(a), 862(a)(1), 871(a), 881(a)(1).
17
This consensus has been defended on numerous grounds which include (1)
benefit principle rationales (which some may consider to assign passive income
primarily to the residence jurisdiction), (2) administrative convenience, and (3) the
(intra-nation) equitable desirability of taxing passive income on the consolidated
progressive resident basis, which best reflects the taxpayer’s ability to pay. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95
TAX NOTES 1793 (June 17, 2002); Paul D. Reese, United States Tax Treaty Policy
Toward Developing Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L. REV. 369, 373
(1987).
18
For some of the few exceptions, see Peggy B. Musgrave, Comments in Session
on “Foreign Reaction to U.S. Tax Reform,” 41 NAT’L TAX J. 365 (1988); John P.
Steines, Jr., Income Tax Implications of Free Trade, 49 TAX L. REV. 675, 676 (1994).
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In an open and competitive global economy, international
investors are able to shift a considerable amount of their (source) tax
burden on capital. This theme helps explain much of what is described
in the following Parts. The tax erosion dynamic was embroiled with
the facilitation of certain conditions that allow greater shifting to
19
debtors. These conditions have one common denominator — they
undermine the bargaining position of the source jurisdiction in setting
its “tax price” for international investments.
Relatively low source taxes laid upon proceeds of debt
transactions make their economics lucrative every time there is a
jurisdictional mismatch in which a lender is a tax resident of a
jurisdiction with lower tax rates than the debtor. This is a combination
of two factors. First, the debtor is able to deduct the interest it pays
from its otherwise highly taxed income. Second, the lender will only
be subject to low (or no) levels of source withholding taxes (on the
gross interest payments) and low income taxes (on its taxable income)
in its country of residence. From the taxpayer’s perspective, this
finance transaction is superior to an equivalent domestic debt
transaction (in which the lender may be exposed to high income taxes)
and to domestic and foreign equity investments in which shareholders
bear at least some of the corporate tax burden and are exposed to
higher income and/or withholding tax rates. To understand the
historical development of the legal conventions applied to interest
from inbound debt investments, one must first understand the
unavoidable tension that is bound to arise from this jurisdictional
mismatch.
The following graphic schema (Figure 2) illustrates the
jurisdictional mismatch. Country A and Country B impose
respectively a 0% and 50% effective tax rate (ETR) on all sources of
corporate income. Countries A and B entered a double taxation
treaty, which eliminates withholding taxes on interest payments. X is a
corporation located in Country B. X took two $1000 loans each
carrying a 10% annual interest rate from two different creditors in
Countries A and B. In a given year X paid $200 interest payments.
These payments are deductible, so X could use them to reduce its
corporate income. Because of the different ETRs in Countries A and
B, X’s creditors will have a different net gain of $100 and $50,
respectively. Since the payments to both creditors are equally
deductible to X, it will prefer to take loans from creditors in Country
A, from which presumably it will be able to get better terms, than
19

See supra Part IV.D for a discussion of these conditions in detail.
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from creditors in Country B. X’s preference to loan from Country A’s
creditors will come at the expense of Country B’s treasury. X’s
interest payments to the foreign creditor will reduce its taxable
income in $100, which given Country B’s 50% ETR, would have
resulted in a $50 tax liability. However, unlike the case of the interest
payments made by X to its creditor in Country B, Country B’s
treasury does not tax any of the foreign creditor’s interest proceeds.
FIGURE 2. JURISDICTIONAL MISMATCH

Unrelated
lender:
$(+100)
net
income*

Country A 0% ETR on corp. income

Deductible Interest
Payments

$100

Corporation X:
$(-200)
on taxable
income**

The Jurisdictional Mismatch
A jurisdictional mismatch occurs
when three conditions are met:
•
Difference in effective
source corporate tax rates
•
Low or negligible
withholding tax rates
•
Payments that, like interest,
are tax deductible.
The unrelated lender from
Country A is subject to a lower
cost of capital than the lender in
Country B, because of the
different ETRs.

$100

Unrelated
lender:
$(+50) net
income***

Country B 50% ETR on corp. income

* Comprised of $100 interest payments received from X + $0 corporate income tax payments.
** Comprised of $(-200) deductible interest expenses.
*** Comprised of $(100) interest payments received from X + $(-50) corporate income tax
payments.

B. Where Do We Go Now?
Tracing the IITR’s development highlights a number of its
problematic features (e.g., IITR’s complexity, which leads to
20
inefficiencies and high compliance and administrative costs).
However, as mentioned before, this article spotlights the development
of the sourcing conventions of interest payments because they best
illustrate the tax erosion dynamic it explores. The next three Parts
provide the article’s main novel contribution to the construction of the
21
IITR’s intellectual history. They identify three thematic phases: the
20
21

Benshalom, supra note 5.
This article addresses the IITR’s intellectual history. It is, therefore, interested
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Revenue Phase, the Trade Phase, and the Anti-Avoidance Phase.
Each thematic phase represents an era in which a specific set of
considerations has dominated policymakers’ considerations with
regard to sourcing. Each is a benchmark in the process of source tax
erosion that the article excavates. The crudeness of the present
article’s research approach has two virtues. First, by formulating an
evolutionary account of the sourcing of income from inbound debt
investments, the article is able to provide its novel understanding of
IITR development. Second, this approach allows the article to
intertwine intimately the IITR’s development with material changes
in the global political economy. Together, both of these virtues allow
the article to extract deeper normative and practical conclusions
regarding the future path of the IITR.
The article’s attempt to make a rough historical division of tax
conventions into chronological phases may unavoidably seem
simplistic. However, trailing the historical development of legal norms
requires periodization to trace the conventions and interests from
which they were molded and the reality of the circumstances from
22
which their contours were forged. This article does not argue that
every theme was unique to a designated period in the IITR’s
23
evolution. Each period is roughly defined, beginning at the point in
which a specific set of considerations begin to gain dominance, up to
the point when a new set of considerations arise. Hence, under the
in how people were explaining, justifying, and theorizing the different sourcing
arrangements established. Accordingly, it primarily refers to secondary material from
the relevant periods that deal with those questions.
22
Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 315 (discussing briefly the necessity of
periodization in historic research).
23
In fact, the scholarship of pioneer policymakers informs us that many of the
different issues, tradeoffs, and considerations that we struggle with today were
already openly recognized in earlier IITR stages. PAUL DEPERON, INTERNATIONAL
DOUBLE TAXATION 11–12 (1945) (“The attitude of governments towards the problem
of international double-taxation is determined by factors such as the degree and
direction of economic development of the country concerned, the commercial and
financial relations that the country maintains or seeks to establish with other
countries, the amount of public revenue obtained by taxing international business and
the technical features of the national tax system.”); Henry S. Bloch & Cyril E.
Heilemann, International Tax Relations, 55 YALE L.J. 1158, 1159, 1166 (1946); H.
David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An
Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 362–64 (1981). The article cites to the
1923 and 1925 reports made to the League of Nations, which recognized that source
taxation of foreign investment is equivalent to a tariff on capital-importing, infringes
with income tax standards of horizontal equity, and is inconsistent with capitalimporting countries’ desires to attract foreign investments.
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article’s conception, a period does not end when it loses its dominance
— rather, it ends when it is fundamentally challenged.
III. THE REVENUE PHASE: FROM THE END OF WWI UNTIL THE END
OF WWII
In the first phase — the Revenue Phase — the article sets out to
demonstrate the original concerns of the different IITR policymakers
in the period between the two world wars. I argue that, unlike the
periods that follow it, the dominant debate during this phase was
about the allocation of revenues between capital-importing and
24
capital-exporting nations. The article’s main claim in this Part is that,
because of the urgency of reducing double taxation after WWI and
the political turbulence in the 1930s and 1940s, the Revenue Phase
resulted in incomplete sourcing conventions. Since then, the IITR’s
sourcing conventions developed as an amiss set of stopgap measures,
which did not try to reformulate the IITR’s original deficiency. This,
as the article demonstrates in its following Parts, contributed to the
dynamics of source tax erosion.
To be sure, at the time, the IITR was primarily concerned with
alleviating double taxation. As a baseline for discussion, it is
important to recognize that Europe had a well established tradition of
liberalized foreign trade and capital investments, which flourished in
25
the pre-WWI years. The concern over double taxation originated
from the International Chambers of Commerce — an umbrella
organization of the business community, which recognized post-war
growth potential in continental Europe, especially in new nations that
26
replaced pre-war empires. This concern was later endorsed by the
governments yearning for foreign investments to restore their
economies. At the same time, coming out from the devastation of

24

P. Verloren van Themaat, Intervention, VIII CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL
47, 48 (1947) (claiming that the pre-war conventions gave more heed
to the theoretical underpinnings of allocating the right to tax while the post-WWII
Anglo-American treaties were a byproduct of a give and take bargaining process).
25
Evelyn Kolm, The Emerging System of Double Taxation Agreements in the
Late 19th and 20th Centuries, FEJLESZTES ES FINANSZIROZAS: Q. HUNGARIAN ECON.
REV. 66, 66–67 (2005) (summarizing the social developments that led to the pre-WWI
market integration).
26
DEPERON, supra note 23, at 14–16; JOHN G. HERNDON, JR., RELIEF FROM
INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 69–120 (1932); Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at
1066–71; Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through
International Agreement 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 102–06 (1945).

INTERNATIONAL
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27

WWI, governments had dire needs for revenue. In this context, the
combination of business ambitions to go global and the (new at the
28
time) income tax based public finance scheme of European countries
resulted in a high double taxation exposure for cross-border activities.
Given the high tax rates imposed during and after WWI, this risk of
double taxation introduced a serious obstacle to re-liberalizing cross29
border trade. This Part demonstrates, however, that even though
trade considerations triggered policymakers’ endeavors to formulate
an IITR, the controversies that delineated its course of development,
especially with relation to inbound financial investments, were by and
large related to the allocation of revenues among sovereigns.
The two decades of the Revenue Phase were a unique period. The
process of delineating the IITR as a new doctrine of law and public
policy involved a lot of experimentation to create terminology as well
as governing principles. This process was simultaneously pursued by
nongovernmental parties (International Chambers of Commerce and
30
academics), as well as by national legislators and bilateral treaty
31
negotiators.
At the beginning of the Revenue Phase there were four income
tax rules of the land. The first was the United Kingdom’s rule which
imposed income tax liabilities on the worldwide income of all its
residents. The second was the United States’ rule, which, to avoid the
problem of double taxation, supplemented the residency taxation with
32
credits for income taxes paid to foreign countries. Both the United

27

Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law, 2 INT’L LAW. 692, 700 (1967–1968).
HERNDON, supra note 26, at 261.
29
Id. at 7; Mitchell B. Carroll, The Development of International Tax Law:
Franco-American Treaty on Double Taxation-Draft Convention on Allocation of
Business Income, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 586, 587 (1935); Burton W. Kanter, The United
States Estate Tax Treaty Program, 9 TAX L. REV. 401, 402 (1954); Rosenbloom &
Langbein, supra note 23, at 361 (“During and shortly after World War I, double
taxation became a matter of worldwide significance. Rates of direct taxation,
particularly income taxation, were increasing, as was the volume of international
business.”).
30
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
COOPERATION (1928); Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of
Double Taxation, 22 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 192, 193 (1930).
31
Kolm, supra note 25, at 71–74.
32
In 1918 Congress enacted, unilaterally, a generous statutory double taxation
relief measure, which credited taxes paid in foreign jurisdictions by American
residents and citizens. George F. James, The Taxation of Business Income from
Foreign Sources, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 234–35 (1946); Graetz & O’Hear, supra note
4, at 1041–59. In 1936, Congress laid another important tax layer to the U.S. IITR by
28
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Kingdom and the United States, which at the time were the most
dominant capital-exporting countries, refrained almost entirely from
33
entering treaties during the Revenue Phase. The third was the rule of
Germany and the countries that emerged from the Austro-Hungarian
empire, which, to avoid double taxation, supplemented the residency
taxation with treaties. These treaties often assigned different sources
34
of income to either the residency or the source jurisdiction. Fourth
was the French rule, which had a strong emphasis on taxation only at
the source.
At the outbreak of WWII, there were more than sixty treaties
intended to relieve double taxation between different countries
35
(mainly in Europe). In general, these treaties, especially those signed
during the 1920s, demonstrated a strong preference toward residence
36
allocation. This is not surprising given that most of these treaties
were signed between declining empires (e.g., Austria and the United
Kingdom) and their former colonies (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, and Ireland). The old empires, likely to be capital
exporters to their former colonies, would benefit from residency
allocation. This allocation of tax revenues probably mirrored the
divergence in bargaining power between the former superpower (even
37
if already in decline) and its previous colony. Additionally, most of
setting a 10%-15% statutory withholding tax rate on the gross payments of interest
(and other payments) to nonresidents (individuals and corporations). See Revenue
Act of 1936, 74 P.L. 740, §§ 211(a), 231(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1714, 1717; Ault &
Brandford, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that the 30% tax rate is a heritage of old times,
when the tax rates on net taxable income were much higher — thus the 30% rate was
actually considered a redress that was necessary because the withholding taxes were
levied on gross income); Marcel Singer, Some American Discriminations Against
Foreign Enterprises, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 776, 779 (1945–1946).
33
DEPERON, supra note 23, at 15; Mitchell B. Carroll, Tax Inducements to
Foreign Trade, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 760, 761 (1945–1946). The only exceptions
for this are the U.S.-French double taxation treaty (which was very limited in scope)
and the U.K.-Ireland treaty (in which Ireland forfeited its right to levy source tax).
The article considers the U.S.-Sweden double taxation treaty signed during WWII
also as an exception.
34
See Kolm, supra note 25, at 71–73; Wang, supra note 26, at 102–07. This was
possible because at the time most income taxes employed in Europe were not like the
idea of economic income we have today, “but impôt reals, an untranslatable
expression for a series of separate taxes imposed on different types of income on a
source basis, such as a tax on land, a tax on business profits and the like . . . .” See
John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1999).
35
DEPERON, supra note 23, at 15.
36
Wang, supra note 26, at 102.
37
The most transparent example for this is the double taxation treaty between
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the pre-WWI European colonies shared the income tax system of
their former rulers. This meant that questions of source were probably
marginal and insignificant. Thus, after the empires were broken, the
dynamic of tax administration continuity may have served as a de
38
facto platform for adopting residence taxation.
Early on, policymakers recognized that, unless some multilateral
coordination norms were introduced to the IITR, the dynamics of
unsystematic legislation and treaty negotiations would produce
different arrangements, posing an immense implicit tax of
39
administrative and compliance costs on foreign trade. As a result, the
most prominent role of delineating IITR conventions during the
Revenue Phase was by and large invested in the League of Nations
(the League) — a body in which poor net capital-importing countries
had dominant representation. The remainder of this Part describes
how these countries tried, unsuccessfully, to counter the inherent
difficulty in source taxing mobile capital assets by using the
egalitarian, multilateral framework of the League to promote a
cartelized arrangement. The open confrontation in the League
the United Kingdom and Ireland, signed in 1926, in which no taxes were levied on the
source level. This arrangement was obviously revenue biased towards Britain, the
main capital exporter at the time. See Wang, supra note 26, at 105–06.
38
Taxpayers operating in different parts of the empire were subject to a single
centralized tax authority and tax rules. Prior to its post-WWI bifurcation, the AustroHungarian Monarchy had two sets of different direct tax systems (one for the more
agrarian Hungary and one for the more industrialized Austria). In the post war era
two things happened: many formerly subordinated vessels became independent, and
the Hungarians accepted most of the Austrian direct tax rules. This made the
implementation of residency much easier. See Kolm, supra note 25, at 67–68, 72–73.
In the British-Irish scenario, it is useful to compare the Irish arrangement with its
arrangement with other, non-European members of the Commonwealth. In those
cases, where because of geographic distance there was no single tax administration,
double taxation arising from U.K. residency was avoided through a regime that
divided the revenues between the United Kingdom and the source jurisdiction. This
alternative regime was intended to encourage U.K. residents’ foreign investment in
the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom deducted source taxes paid up to half of its
tax liability and the other (source jurisdiction colony) provided the rest of the relief to
the taxpayer so that the taxpayers’ tax liability would not exceed the lower of the two
taxes. See DEPERON, supra note 23, at 15 (noting that Britain adopted the splitting
arrangements to encourage investments in the commonwealth); James, supra note 32,
at 231 (describing how Britain’s capital-importing colonies (e.g., South Africa,
Australia) exempted foreign sourced income earned by their residents altogether);
Wang, supra note 26, at 74.
39
HERNDON, supra note 26, at 69–171 (providing a description of the different
convoluted arrangements produced by national legislators and treaties during the
1920s).
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between debtor and creditor countries on the taxation of capital
income is the most telling example of the importance of revenue
consideration in this era. The prospects of such a cartelized
arrangement may have seemed more plausible at the time than they
do today. At the time, international investors operated in a less
mobile, transparent, and sophisticated business environment, which
made it difficult to shift source taxes to debtors.
The League’s process of codification was both technically and
politically convoluted. On the technical level, the various League
committees had to agree on terminology that corresponded well to the
various, trailblazer income tax systems, all of which had not yet taken
root in a nonwar-crisis environment. The attempt to allocate resources
between (what eventually became coined) source and residence
40
jurisdictions was protean and subject to fluctuation. Some practical
mechanisms of taxing and auditing businesses with cross-border
activities were also discussed, though not resolved fully, during that
41
period of time.
Revealing as the discussions over these technical obstacles are,
this article focuses on the political reconciliation that took place in
those discussions. Despite the European countries’ will to remove
income tax barriers that sparked initially the IITR formulation’s
endeavors, the main issues in the Revenue Phase debates did not deal
with how to best facilitate trade. In fact, the bone of contention
between sovereigns during the Revenue Phase related to the
allocation of the revenue base. The sparring partners on the different
42
sides of the debate were the non-European and continental
European debtor countries, on the one hand, and the net capital-

40

Wang, supra note 26, at 81–88. The article notes that, in the course of shaping
the IITR’s terminology, alternative criteria were suggested to distinguish between
different income sources for the purpose of allocating them to the country of
residency/domicile or source/origin (e.g., income derived from tangibles versus
intangible assets and personal versus impersonal taxes).
41
SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION: A STUDY IN THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BUSINESS REGULATION 27–33 (1992) (describing the
Carrol committee’s works and findings and the 1935 draft allocation convention);
Carroll, supra note 27, at 704 (explaining how the arm’s-length standard was
formulated); Wang, supra note 26, at 79 (noting that the League’s 1933 draft
convention suggested the use of formulary methods based on turnover for permanent
establishments when the arm’s-length standard did not work adequately).
42
Wang, supra note 26, at 86–89 (describing how the creditor countries opposed
suggestions made by the United Kingdom to tax investment income only in investors’
country of domicile).
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exporting countries (mainly the United Kingdom and, to a lesser
43
degree, the United States) on the other.
At the forefront of the debate was the right to tax the income
44
proceeds of capital investments — namely, interest and dividends.
This proved a major issue because of the enormous debts European
countries, primarily France, Italy, and Russia, incurred during the
45
War. Settling the right to tax the interest proceeds of debts was
therefore tantamount to determining to what extent the debtor
countries were to bear these unheard of amounts of sovereign debts
by themselves. In allocating the primary sourcing right over capital
resources, the United Kingdom, the biggest capital-exporting country
at the time, argued vehemently in favor of an exclusively residence46
based taxation of such passive income sources. In other words, the
British believed that income taxes should only be imposed as direct
taxes by the country of residence. The firm opposition posed by the
United Kingdom was the source of much of the controversy during
47
the Revenue Phase.
Over the course of the 1920s, the League’s position on this issue
48
proved volatile and subject to changes. In 1923, a nominated
committee of four professors submitted a report to the League,
recommending the right to levy taxes on all intangible wealth
(including debt investments but excluding mortgages) to be granted
exclusively to the investor-creditors’ domicile. This was by and large
refuted in a report submitted by a group of Technical Experts to the
49
Financial Committee of the League in 1925. Net capital-exporting
countries responded to the debtor countries’ 1925 success with much
more active participation in the League. Most apparently, the United
43

Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 1072 (claiming that the battle lines were
drawn as a result of the resolutions made by the 1923 Rome congress, which assigned
the right to tax interest and dividends to both source and residence jurisdictions).
44
Id. at 1077.
45
T.B. Macaulay, The Allied Debt to the United States, WASH. STAR, Aug. 27,
1922, at 4–5.
46
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 1086–87.
47
For more details, see Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 4, at 1069–73, 1084–86
(describing the role of the prominent United Kingdom in the International Chamber
of Commerce 1921–1923 and in the League).
48
Wang, supra note 26, at 81–96.
49
HERNDON, supra note 26, at 58–62 The book notes that the 1925 report, which
allocated the right to tax impersonal taxes to source jurisdictions and direct-personal
taxes to the domicile jurisdiction, was expected to shift revenues from creditors to
debtors countries — this motivated the United States, as a net capital-exporting
country, to join the League’s fiscal committee discussion.
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States, which was not a League member, joined actively in the
League’s fiscal committee discussions. This resulted in a backlash
against source allocation. Article 3 of the draft bilateral convention
published by the League in 1927 allowed the source jurisdiction to
take the first tax bite on most passive income payments but required it
to refund those taxes once evidence showed that taxes were levied in
50
the residence jurisdiction. This strengthening of residency revenue
allocation triggered a harsh retaliation from debtor countries. As a
result of this struggle, the issue of interest revenues’ allocation was not
51
resolved. In 1928, three draft conventions, each of them providing
different allocation rules for interest income, were published. These
arrangements were: (1) taxation solely at source (convention I-a) or
residence (I-b) and (2) a hybrid of source taxation with a residual
52
residence tax (I-c). In a sense, the League’s decision to publish the
three model conventions reflected a general withdrawal from the
53
strong pro-residency stance in treaties signed during the early 1920s.
The draft convention of 1943, which sealed the Revenue Phase,
was a sharp contrast to the League’s ambivalent stance during the
1920s. The League’s fiscal committee met in Mexico. There, without
representatives from war battered Europe, Latin American countries
dictated a pro-source agenda. In the context of interest, the prosource agenda produced article IX, which granted source jurisdictions
54
the exclusive right to tax income from movable capital. This
convention best illustrates the centrality of revenue considerations
during that period — showing that source countries were not willing
to forfeit these considerations for the sake of attracting foreign
investments and engendering cross-border trade. It further
demonstrates the overall function of the League during the Revenue
Phase in strengthening the notion of source taxation. Nevertheless,
the limited impact the Mexico convention eventually had is also
reflective on capital-importing countries’ failure to entrench
sufficiently the notion of source taxation so that it would stand the test
of time.
50

Wang, supra note 26, at 89.
DEPERON, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that this was one of the few issues on
which the League did not take a clear stand).
52
HERNDON, supra note 26, at 185–90, 238–41; Carroll, supra note 27, at 699.
53
DEPERON, supra note 23, at 17 (noting that although most pre-war treaties
assigned the right to tax financial income to the residence jurisdiction, they did not
preclude the possibility of a withholding tax laid on the source level); Carroll, supra
note 29, at 587.
54
Carroll, supra note 27, at 708–10.
51
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To flesh out the difference between the Revenue Phase and later
periods, it is useful to think about the changing discourse in favor of
the right to tax at the source. In Revenue Phase discourse, this right
was framed as a right to receive revenues from capital investments in
source jurisdictions. In sharp contrast, today source jurisdiction
supremacy is typically framed as the right of the source jurisdiction to
offer foreign investors a genuine reduction in source taxes.
Developing source countries argue that these reductions often do not
meet their goals of attracting foreign investments because they are
(arguably) absorbed by residence taxes laid on investors. While the
Revenue Phase’s discourse was about source countries’ right for
revenues, prevalent current discourse is about their right not to collect
taxes to induce foreign investments. Although these two positions are
55
not analytically mutually exclusive, the practical gap dividing them
illustrates the difference between contemporary and Revenue Phase
sourcing conventions.
The formal victory of debtor countries, embodied in the Mexican
convention towards the end of the Revenue Phase, turned out to be
56
more marginal than one could have originally expected. The
Revenue Phase ended at the end of WWII and the beginning of the
Cold War. It had tremendous impact with regard to IITR’s
terminology and on some of its principles, which still echo in
contemporary IITR treaties’ discourse. Many of these arrangements,
still present today, may be understood as a byproduct of the debtor57
versus-creditor country controversy.
The Revenue Phase’s actual allocation conventions, overall
inclined to support a stronger source entitlement to tax, were severely
undermined by the conventions that followed during the subsequent
Trade Phase. These trade oriented sourcing conventions were initially
developed by capital-exporting countries (e.g., the United States and
the United Kingdom). They were later endorsed by the Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (the OECD), which,
during the Trade Phase years, was comprised almost solely of Western
European and North American countries.

55

In theory, source jurisdictions could levy taxes and use them to subsidize
(presumably undersupplied) foreign investments.
56
Bloch & Heilemann, supra note 23, at 1166–67.
57
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 366 (noting that the sourcing
model of assigning income based on classification of the sources in which it derived
was adopted during the Revenue Phase to enable a compromise between creditor and
debtor countries).

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC

652

4/14/2008 12:05 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:631

IV. THE TRADE PHASE: POST-WWII TO 1990S
The Trade Phase is the period of time that roughly overlapped
with the Cold War. While the terminology of the IITR was engraved
during the Revenue Phase, its dominant allocation conventions took
form during this post-WWII era. The article argues that the Trade
Phase paradigm, which advocated the removal of tax obstacles from
the flow of international investment, was unbalanced and resulted in
severe revenue losses and inequities.
The star of the “British position” during the Revenue Phase,
which asserted that interest proceeds should be taxed only in the
creditor country, was yet to rise. As it turned out, the substantive
allocation norms of the IITR were influenced more heavily by events
that took place after WWII than by those of the Revenue Phase. The
political turbulence in the first half of the 20th century and the radical
shifts in geopolitical power, which preceded and followed WWII,
limited the substantive impact of the Revenue Phase’s allocation
conventions. This limited impact is perhaps best exemplified by the
way international, tax base incomes from inbound debt investments
were de facto allocated during the post-WWII decades. Most
interestingly, while skewing the sourcing of withholding taxes on
capital income is by no means revenue neutral, the discourse that
eventually led to this erosion focused on trade and investment
considerations, allotting less heed to revenue or distributive (let alone
redistributive) considerations.
A. The Rationales of the “Trade Argument”
The main normative argument of the article is that investment
and trade considerations of the Trade Phase have undermined unduly
the fiscal base of the IITR and its ability to elicit a set of governing
equity standards. To fully understand this claim about trade
considerations’ inappropriate impact, one must first understand the
historical context in which these considerations gained dominance and
their underlying rationales.
International trade and investment regimes and the IITR shared a
parallel development, with only few (tangential) policy oriented
58
attempts to resolve this gulf (although recently there have been more
58

An exception to this is the World Trade Organization (WTO) discussions and
rulings with regard to the U.S. income tax export subsidies. See Yariv Brauner,
International Trade and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, but Not Reconciled, 25
VA. TAX REV. 251, 295–97 (2005) (exploring a number of WTO cases in which U.S.
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59

academic attempts to address this issue). An obvious connection
could nevertheless be drawn between these regimes’ underlying goals.
Both regimes facilitate international cooperation through sets of
reciprocal restraints that nations undertake, which limit the ability of
60
government actions to disturb transnational commercial activity.
While the IITR generally restricted its role to the elimination of
double income and capital gain taxation impediments, the
international trade and investment regime sought to liberalize trade
and investment through the reciprocal and gradual reduction (and
eventually even elimination) of tariffs, import quotas, and export
subsidies. The pillars of the international trade regime are the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), initially agreed to in 1947.
These agreements eventually laid the institutional framework of what
is known today as the World Trade Organization. The GATT were a
unique set of agreements, since countries undertaking GATT
obligations also undertook the obligation to abide by future GATT
rules in future negotiations. Besides enforcement mechanisms, the
GATT agreements impose three types of reciprocal commitments on
their members — tariff limitation, a certain “code of (proper)
61
conduct,” and, most importantly, nondiscrimination.
This Part draws a conceptual connection between the two regimes
with reference to the post-WWII period ending with the beginning of
the 1990s. The intuitive connection between withholding taxes on the
gross income proceeds of foreign investment, essentially tariffs on
income tax export subsidies were found to be inconsistent with U.S. obligations);
Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between
Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J.
INT’L L. 79, 89–95 (1998) (describing the Uruguay talks around these issues in 1993).
59
Brauner, supra note 58; Catherine Brown & Christine Manolakas, Trade in
Technology Within the Free Trade Zone: The Impact of the WTO Agreement, NAFTA,
and Tax Treaties on the NAFTA Signatories, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 71 (2000);
Green, supra note 58, at 88–89 (comparing the substantive obligations of countries
under GATT to bind their tariffs and those frequently undertaken under double
taxation treaties); Paul R. McDaniel, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Trade
Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions, 57 TAX L.
REV. 275 (2004); David B. Oliver, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Tax Treaties and
the Market-State, 56 TAX L. REV. 587 (2003); Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah,
(How) Should Trade Agreements Deal With Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV. 533
(2002); Warren, supra note 7, at 147–49; Whitney Whisenhunt, To Zedillo or not to
Zedillo: Why the World Needs an ITO, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 541 (2002).
60
John S. Brown, Formulary Taxation and NAFTA, 49 TAX L. REV. 759, 799–
800 (1994).
61
KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 48–49 (2003).
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foreign lenders and investors, was openly recognized by scholars at
62
the beginning of the Trade Phase. The article argues that there is an
ever growing “trade considerations” spillover into the IITR
policymaking. The most obvious landslide victory for trade
considerations during this period is undoubtedly the colossal
reduction of source laid withholding taxes on the gross income
proceeds of inbound capital investments. Nevertheless, one should
refrain from equating the IITR’s role as a promoter of free trade
solely with the reduction of source based withholding taxes. A more
profound trade implication of the IITR’s treaties, which typically
receives less attention than withholding taxes, is their ability to reduce
the tax-related uncertainties of foreign investors. Both are discussed
in more detail below.
As mentioned previously, the Trade Phase is signaled not by the
fact that trade considerations were accounted for, but for the manner
in which trade considerations marginalized more traditional revenue
and equity considerations. While some critics have argued against
63
64
actual reduction in tax barriers on trade and against the plausibility

62

Bloch & Heilemann, supra note 23, at 1159, 1166, 1173 (arguing that while the
effects of taxes on trade are marginal, they can have a significant influence on the
profit margin and the investment environment, and observing that debtor nations’
preference for source taxation is counterproductive since “a country in need of capital
may be willing to forego taxing the return on that capital . . . [and] willing to enter an
exemption type treaty” and concluding by saying that “[if] free flow of trade [is a
matter] of international concern . . . then fiscal policies, too, must be a matter for
international investigation”); Roy Blough, Treaties to Eliminate International Double
Taxation and Fiscal Evasion, 5 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 208, 208–09 (1947)
(“Aside from the question of equity is the economic aspect of international doubletaxation. World prosperity is promoted by enlarged world trade and capital
movements, free from the restrictions which the operation, often the unintended
operation, of tax laws may impose. International double taxation discourages the
growth of world economy. The discouragement arises, not only from the taxes
themselves, but also from uncertainty as to when they will be imposed.”); James,
supra note 32, at 231.
63
Herrick K. Lidstone, Double Taxation of Foreign Income? Or an Adventure in
International Double Talk, 44 VA. L REV. 921, 925–26 (1959) (arguing that the
mechanisms for relieving double taxation removed trade obstacles only to big
American multinational enterprises (MNE or MNEs, as appropriate) that lobbied
Congress to obtain generous benefits).
64
Brauner, supra note 58, at 283 (advocating that trade and taxation rationales
are in many senses antithetical, and the most visible example for that is the
differentiation in withholding tax-rates under double taxation treaties, which violates
the “most favorable nation” principle advocated by the WTO).
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66

and the (analytical and normative) desirability of this fusion of
international trade and tax, relatively little attention has been paid to
the question of why trade considerations triumphed so dramatically
over alternative considerations.
The answer has several layers. First, trade consideration
dominated in the first two to three decades of the IITR’s post-WWII
development because Western capital-exporting countries (namely,
the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom) desired
to re-establish international trade practices following the havoc
wreaked by WWII. It is relatively straightforward to point out that
this liberalization was necessary to promote U.S. economic interests
(and specifically U.S. business sector interests) by creating demand for
67
U.S. capital and production surpluses.
Nevertheless, the
liberalization objectives also supported a broader notion concerning
world public order in the post-WWII era. Following the grief caused
by the devastation of WWII, it has been observed that:
Unless statesmen are able to solve the perplexing problems of
international double taxation, serious economic and political
results may follow. An emerging world system designed to
achieve peace through political integration cannot withstand
the economic balkanization to which double taxation will
68
contribute.
Simply put, in a world at the verge of an escalation into the Cold War
period, free trade was both a carrot and an ideological “commoncarrier” of anti-communist Western policy. Just like the Marshall
Plan, free trade was a vehicle for rebuilding Europe and acquiring
allies (e.g., Japan and Germany). It was a way to make sure that
American investors and MNEs would take an active part in a
European/Japanese resurrection. Emerging as the dominant winner of
WWII, with unmatched industrial capabilities and capital resources,
the United States aimed to lead a new capitalistic world order. It is
65

H. David Rosenbloom, What’s Trade Got To Do With It?, 49 TAX L. REV. 593,
597–98 (1994) (arguing that the attempt to equate tariffs and withholding taxes just
because both pose barriers on trade and investments is analytically wrong, since there
are many attributes that differentiate between these two mechanisms of social policy).
66
Richard M. Bird, A View From the North, 49 TAX L. REV. 745, 748 (1994)
(“[T]he trade policy dog should [not] necessarily wag the tax policy tail.”).
67
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & F.E. KOCH, INCOME TAX TREATIES: THE INCOME
TAX CONVENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA AND
OTHER COUNTRIES 5 (1949); James, supra note 32, at 229.
68
Wang, supra note 26, at 73.
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easy, therefore, to see why the United States revered trade
considerations as a major component of its foreign (tax) policy.
Second, in the perspective of many countries at the beginning of
the Trade Phase, there was no clear distinction between trade and
revenue considerations. Capital-exporting countries, which taxed
worldwide income of corporate and individuals residents (most
notably, the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United
Kingdom), could have expected a net increase in their revenues as a
result of reciprocal reductions in withholding taxes on capital income
69
on the source country level. One should bear in mind that, when
trade considerations took form, the international tax planning
70
industry and offshore tax havens were not firmly established.
From the perspective of many net capital-importing countries, the
need to prioritize trade over revenue considerations may be explained
by their acute need for foreign investment to re-establish post-war
71
economies, compounded by the U.S. monopoly over capital
resources at the end of WWII. Additionally, one may assume, the
remission of the withholding tax base was made easier because it was
never a solid source of revenue for many capital-importing countries.
Erosion of the withholding tax base was thus erosion of a marginal
source of tax revenues. These reductions in withholding taxes in the
early stages of the Trade Phase could be perceived as the beginnings
of a vicious tax-competitive practice cycle among source jurisdictions
for the taxation of nonresidents’ passive income.
The analysis becomes much more complicated in the later stages
of the Trade Phase (during the late 1970s–1990s), when the sharp
distinction between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries
gets somewhat blurred. Hence, in the U.S. case, reducing investment
barriers for U.S. investors is still the objective of reciprocal reductions
on withholding taxes. However, this treaty policy also eases the tax
burden over the inflow of capital investments, particularly bond
investments, into the United States. This inflow plays a crucial role in
72
light of the U.S. mounting trade and fiscal deficits. In this context,
69

Robert J. Patrick, Jr., United States Negotiating Objectives and Model Treaties,
in 1977 TAX TREATIES AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY 12–13 (Virginia di Francesco &
Nicolas Liakas eds., 1977).
70
This was not a coincidence. Both these phenomena gradually matured in
response to the tax-arbitrage possibilities that residents from capital-exporting
countries have in an IITR characterized by low source taxes in some jurisdictions.
71
Wang, supra note 26, at 115.
72
Diane Renfroe et al., Earnings Stripping: An Analysis of the Proposed
Regulations Under Section 163(j), 91 TNI 43-46 (Oct. 23, 1991).
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the article examines the intriguing metamorphosis of U.S. IITR
policies during the Trade Phase as a case study. The United States
started the Trade Phase as the only major capital-exporting country.
As a result, while all other capital-importing countries surrendered
fiscal needs to compete for U.S. investments, the United States sought
reciprocal withholding tax reductions to ease its residents’ foreign
investment experiences, while adhering to the notion of capital-export
neutrality to retrieve some of its fiscal losses in its resident revenue
base. This capital-export neutrality emphasis changed over the course
of the Trade Phase as the United States became a debtor nation. To
successfully attract for foreign investments, the U.S. ideal of capital
export neutrality had to shuffle off its mortal coil with regards to
inbound debt investments. This was necessary for the United States to
compete, like any other country, for foreign capital.
The article demonstrates the applicability of the above analysis to
the source income tax treatment of inbound debt investments. While
the present article’s analysis focuses mainly on U.S. treaty law, it also
addresses other important representative examples. As mentioned,
the baseline for the discussion, established during the Revenue Phase,
is the 30% withholding tax rate imposed by federal statutory law on
73
interest payment made to nonresidents. This Part discusses how the
effect of withholding source taxes on interest is eroded through three
major exemptions: (1) the reduction/exemption of interest payments
made by treaties, (2) the bank deposit exemption, and (3) the
74
portfolio interest exemption.
B. U.S. Treaty Law
75

With few exceptions, scholars generally agree that treaties are
one of the core income tax policy stimulants of transnational
76
investments and, as such, an avenue for economic development.
73

See supra note 16.
MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED
STATES 2-47, 2-54 (2002).
75
See, e.g., Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to SubSaharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 644 (2005) (arguing that
treaties have a limited impact on reducing trade barriers to developing countries).
76
PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS: A MANUAL ON THE OECD
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL A-5–A-7 (2001) (noting that
both the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) model treaties recognize the attempts to reduce double
taxation as motivated by trade and development objectives); Jeffrey M. Colon,
Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy at the
74
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77

Leaving aside treaties’ compliance cost reductions and signaling
78
benefits, treaties induce transnational trade between signatory
sovereigns mainly through a mutual relaxation of (source and
79
residence) tax rules.
Thus, with the exception of information sharing initiatives
directed to counter tax evasion, treaties are a more useful policy tool
to limit taxation than to solve problems of untaxed (or under-taxed)
80
income. This relaxation of tax rules has two prongs. The country of
residence must modify income taxes to grant its taxpayers’ (at least
partial) relief for taxes paid in the source jurisdiction. In return,
source jurisdictions must reduce withholding taxes on investments and
leases and avoid imposing discriminatory income tax rules on active
81
income generating activities that are controlled by foreign residents.
From a perspective that seeks to liberalize international
investments, withholding taxes have an undisputable negative effect.
Crossroads, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 786 (1999); William P. Streng, U.S. Tax Treaties:
Trends, Issues, & Policies in 2006 and Beyond, 59 SMU L. REV. 853, 856–58 (2006).
77
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 197 (2000) (noting that an
additional trade enhancing aspect of treaties is reducing the compliance uncertainties
faced by foreign investors); Blough, supra note 62, at 208; Paul D. Reese, United
States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries: The China Example, 35
UCLA L. REV. 369, 375 (1987) (noting that, especially with regards to permanent
establishments, the compliance burdens of dealing with a foreign tax system may
make the entire investment unattractive).
78
David H. Rosenbloom, Current Developments in Regard To Tax Treaties, 40
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 31, 31–52 (1982); Miranda Stewart, Global
Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and
Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 148 (2003) (“Bilateral tax treaties seem
to serve largely to ‘signal that a country is willing to adopt the international norms’
regarding trade and investment, and hence, that the country is a safe place to
invest . . . . The signing of a tax treaty is often presented as an important symbol of
international capitalist engagement.”).
79
DEPERON, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the contribution of treaties to the
“development of international trade” as “render[ing] more acceptable to national
treasuries the sacrifices involved in the elimination of double-taxation”); Richard L.
Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71,
71 (1995).
80
Michael S. Lebovitz & Theodore P. Seto, The Fundamental Problem of
International Taxation, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 532 (2001).
81
U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries 8 (2001) [hereinafter
U.N. Treaty]; Green, supra note 58, at 113–14; Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in
a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1995)
(providing a good summary of the way treaties reduce source tax rates); David R.
Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 459 (1996).
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As is most evident in the case of capital-intensive sectors, withholding
82
taxes are imposed on gross income and therefore do not correspond
to similar (possibly progressive) income taxes imposed on domestic
investors, which take into account their (net) ability to pay. In the
financial industry, laying high withholding tax rates over interest may
have severe effects due to high volumes of interest payments and
83
relatively small margins of profit. The article shows that the tendency
of treaties to impose lower tax rates on interest payments than on
returns to equity facilitated a (de facto) acknowledgment that source
country entitlement on income derived from debt investments is
weaker than from equity investments.
Treaties are also constructed to help countries protect residents’
foreign investment interests from falling prey to the fiscal needs of
84
host countries. Although it is now widely believed that the discipline
of the international financial markets and the dynamic of tax
competition effectively counter some of these tendencies, that is not
necessarily how the issue was perceived at the end of WWII. As
mentioned, at the beginning of the Revenue Phase, nonresidents were
susceptible to abusive tax treatment by countries eager for revenue. In
light of this, and in light of foreign investors’ inability to move many
types of investments in response to changes in tax policy created by a
political process over which they held no control, treaties had a
prominent role in easing investor concerns over foreign investments.
Thus, countries’ obligations to limit withholding taxes and, even more
imperatively, to adhere to nondiscrimination norms, played a pivotal
role in alleviating tax-related uncertainties associated with foreign
85
investing during the first years of the Trade Phase. This is especially
true with respect to the ability to deduct payments made to foreign
86
parties, as discussed in greater detail in the next Part.

82

STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES: WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 16–17
(Kluwer Law International 1998).
83
Ault, supra note 11, at 570.
84
F.E. KOCH, THE DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 4–5 (Stevens & Sons
Limited 1947).
85
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAX
ADVISORY GROUP DRAFT NO. 21 REPORTER’S STUDY 141 (1992).
86
Slemrod & Avi-Yonah, supra note 59, at 546 (“With certain exceptions, [the
anti-discrimination provision in treaties usually requires that] payments of interest,
royalties and other disbursements to foreign residents, for the purposes of
determining taxable income, are to be deductible under the same conditions as
payments to domestic residents.”).
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This Part describes the manner by which the United States,
through its treaty network, has facilitated a significant (reciprocal)
reduction in the withholding tax rates with all of its major trading
87
partners. The reduction has fatally eroded the fiscal viability of
withholding taxes (especially on interest payments) as a source of
revenue. Devoid of any substantive fiscal content, statutory
withholding taxes mainly operate today as a measure to induce double
88
taxation treaty negotiations with the United States.
The article identifies and analyzes two constitutive moments in
the history of U.S. treaty policy: the completion of the U.S.-U.K. tax
convention in 1945 and the promulgation of the U.S. Model Treaty in
1976.
1. The U.S.-U.K. Double Taxation Treaty, 1945
The importance of the U.S.-U.K. double taxation treaty (the
Treaty) results from the fact that it was signed by the two dominant
Western capitalist powers who won the war immediately after WWII,
as the Western and Eastern blocks of the Cold War era were
beginning to form. Given the dominant position of the United States
and the United Kingdom in the post-WWII global economy, the
conventions the Treaty introduced during the course of the Trade
Phase have become the unchallenged core of the IITR.
With regard to the tax treatment of transnational capital income,
and specifically to the taxation of interest payments, the Treaty
introduced the following prominent notions. First, it separated tax
treatment of dividends and interest payments. As mentioned
previously, this separation has been vindicated on the grounds of a
“real difference” doctrine, which detached interest earnings from the
debtor’s jurisdiction because, unlike dividends, they were not
89
considered to be derived from the source.
Second, the Treaty exempted interest payments from any
90
withholding source taxes. In this respect, the Treaty endorsed the

87

MCINTYRE, supra note 74, at 2-37–2-38.
Id. at 2-47; Jones, supra note 34, at 3 (“The more outrageous the provisions of
internal law, the better the starting position for negotiating treaties.”); Roin, supra
note 81, at 1765 (noting that reducing withholding taxes on passive income may result
in a revenue gain because of more taxes resulting from more foreign investments).
89
EHRENZWEIG & KOCH, supra note 67, at 44–45.
90
Income Tax Treaty, art. VII, Apr. 16, 1945, U.S.-U.K., 4 Tax Treaties (CCH)
¶ 10,962 (expired) [hereinafter The Treaty].
88
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91

long standing “British position” of the Revenue Phase, which, as
noted in the previous Part, assigned the right to impose direct
92
personal taxes solely to the domicile/residence jurisdiction.
The Treaty went beyond the elimination of double taxation and
left a longstanding, eminent mark on international tax legislation and
93
policy of both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, although rarely recognized as such, the completion of
the Treaty comprised the major and most fundamental building block
of the IITR during the Trade Phase. It laid the foundation for the
IITR’s distinction between the source tax treatment of active and
passive income and the treatment of dividends and interest payments.
This had a prominent effect on the income tax allocation of proceeds
from transnational investments. Particularly with debt investments,
the Treaty’s determination that passive income should be taxed only
by the residence jurisdiction had a major impact on revenue
allocation. This was the League’s original determination from 1923,
which capital-importing countries tried so fiercely to overturn during
the course of the Revenue Phase. Given the exceptionally strong
position of both (capital-exporting) economies at the time (the United
States commanding the lion’s share of capital resources and the
United Kingdom standing in a leading financial and trading position),
the Treaty’s terms and concepts were internalized into customary
practices of double taxation treaties. The article points out that the
Treaty predated the League’s final London convention from 1946. It
was therefore the first to articulate and adopt many of the IITR’s
94
sourcing conventions. These conventions were by and large

91

PICCIOTTO, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that the residence principle was
adopted in the United Kingdom in 1909 as part of an effort to legitimize the income
tax).
92
KOCH, supra note 84, at 10.
93
PICCIOTTO, supra note 41, at 45 (suggesting that following the adoption of the
Treaty, the United Kingdom adopt a foreign tax credit relief legislation); HERMON M.
WELLS, UNITED STATES POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME
170–71 (1950) (noting that prior to the Treaty, the United States refrained from
substantially reducing its 30% withholding tax rates through treaties); Carroll, supra
note 33, at 772.
94
The Treaty was the first to adopt the notion of source primacy (discussed on
page 7), which is supplemented by residence jurisdiction obligation, to relieve double
taxation. This comes in contrast to most of the pre-WWII treaties, which typically
assigned the right to tax a specific source of income either to the source or to the
residence jurisdiction. See P. Verloren van Themaat, The Anglo-American Group of
Tax Conventions, Concluded Since 1939, Compared with Pre-War Treaties, III
CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 1, 6 (1947).
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95

incorporated into the League’s London Convention and later picked
up by the OECD Model Treaty discussed below. Furthermore, both
96
the United States and, even more so the United Kingdom, entered
into a series of treaties with Western European countries shortly after
97
signing the Treaty. The series of treaties, all based on the Treaty,
comprise the pillars of the post-WWII treaties network. Hence, the
Revenue Phase’s sourcing conventions were not emphasized, partially
because the United States and the United Kingdom did not endorse
them by refraining from entering treaties. By the same token, the
Treaty’s Trade Phase sourcing conventions were absorbed so
profoundly into the IITR because these two Goliaths used the Treaty
as a model for their following treaties. Accordingly, the Treaty is the
(self-crowned) codification of the piecemeal legacy created by the
League.
A careful analysis of the balance struck by the Treaty with regards
to source tax treatment of interest payments reveals two important
insights about the premises of the Trade Phase it initiated. First, the
United States accepted exemption of interest from withholding taxes
98
despite net revenue loss. This merits clarification, since the United
95

Like the Treaty, the 1946 London convention prioritizes the residence
jurisdiction. Its allocation arrangements greatly resemble those of the Treaty. For
example, the articles in the 1946 London convention — IV (business enterprises), V
(shipping income), VII (compensation for services), VIII and IX (the income from
movable capital: dividends and interest payments), and X(2) (royalties from
intangibles) — have allocation arrangements that correspond better with the Treaty
arrangements (III, V, XI(3), VI and VII, VIII), than with Mexico’s 1943 convention
source allocation arrangements. See London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions:
Commentary and Text, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.88 1946 II.A. (1946); Carroll,
supra note 27, at 709–20 (making a comparison between the OECD Model Treaty
and the Mexico and London draft conventions and concluding that the OECD model
incorporated most of the London convention’s arrangements, which with respect to
interest, followed the Treaty’s arrangement).
96
Jones, supra note 34, at 1–3 (noting that out of the 100 in force,
comprehensive treaties the United Kingdom had entered into by 1999, the first fifty
were entered into between the years of 1945–1951, the Treaty being the first of those
agreements).
97
John G. Archiballd, U.K.-U.S.A. Double Taxation Convention, VIII CAHIERS
DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 1, 18–25 (1947) (discussing the eminent effect of the
Treaty on the treaties the United Kingdom entered into in subsequent years with
certain Commonwealth members); Mitchell B. Carroll, Double Taxation Convention
of The United States since 1939, V CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 25, 26
(1947); Mitchell B. Carroll, Evolution of U.S. Treaties to Avoid Double Taxation of
Income, Part II, 3 INT’L LAW. 129, 139–40 (1968–1969) [hereinafter Carroll,
Evolution].
98
EHRENZWEIG & KOCH, supra note 67, at 139.
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States was by no means in an inferior bargaining position. There are a
99
100
number of tactical and cynical explanations for the United States’
acceptance of the interest withholding exemption rule. The article,
however, points out that this endorsement represents an
acknowledgment by U.S. tax policymakers that source tax exemptions
on investment income are justified, despite revenue loss consequences
of the Treaty, because of their positive effect on the free flow of
capital. U.S. policymakers were able to look beyond the net bilateral
revenue impact of the Treaty to promote an arrangement that, in the
101
long run, would advance U.S. objectives. Soon after its completion,
the United States entered into a series of treaties with Western
European countries that followed the same interest allocation
arrangement. In all of these cases, countries desiring access to New
York money markets waived most rights to levy source withholding
102
taxes on gross interest payments made to Americans, leading to U.S.
revenue gains.
Second, the Treaty’s unofficial “codification” of the policy behind
double taxation treaties engraved the writing on the wall with regard
to the IITR’s future development during the Trade Phase. That the
IITR was founded on a contractual agreement between the two
richest nations demonstrates that rather than promoting a vox
populorum vox Dei (the voice of peoples is the voice of God/the law),
the reign of capital intensive countries triumphed. Additionally, it
demonstrates that it was pro-investment, rather than fiscal or source
tax equity considerations, that laid down the law in the IITR. In this
respect, the profoundness of the Treaty transcends the manner in

99

Id. (noting that this compromise was easy to swallow from an American
perspective, since 75% of British investors’ holdings in the United States were in the
form of equity rather than debt).
100
U.S. treaty negotiators could assume reasonably that due to its high level of
accumulated capital resources at the end of WWII, the long-term net fiscal effects of
the exemption were likely to even out and perhaps even reverse after a short while.
101
Clarence Castimore, Income Tax Treaties with France, Sweden and Canada
and the Convention with Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 4 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON
FED. TAX’N 537, 547 (1946) (asserting that the Treaty, and the treaties that followed
it, had a pronounced objective of alleviating double taxation to foster foreign trade
and investments that would result in more revenues).
102
Carroll, Evolution, supra note 97, at 139; Charles R. Irish, International
Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
292, 294–95 (1974) (describing how the United States used its favorable bargaining
position at the end of WWII to induce Western European countries to deemphasize
their source tax rights upon entering into treaties with it).
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which its actual mechanisms and principles echo in current treaty
practices.
2. The Promulgation of the U.S. Model Treaty, 1976
The U.S. Model Treaty can be understood as the second in a
sequence of three model tax treaties: the OECD, the U.S., and the
United Nations (U.N.) Model Treaties. The underlying theme behind
the first in that series, the OECD Model Treaty published initially in
1963, was to provide potential double taxation treaty signatories with
a contractual and interpretational anchor through which they could
103
reduce the transactional costs of reaching an agreement. In the
context of withholding taxes, the OECD provided a number of focal
tax rates. These tax rates represented a “reasonable” equilibrium,
from which it was implicitly understood that signatories would not
deviate substantially.
The OECD Model Treaty followed the London convention,
which, as mentioned, was inspired by the Treaty. It refuted the
conclusions of the Model Bilateral Convention agreed upon by the
League in Mexico in 1943. It accepted the Treaty’s distinction
between passive and active income and, similarly to the Treaty,
assigned a stronger claim in the former to the country of residency. It
was, therefore, anything but ideologically neutral. The
institutionalization of the OECD Model Treaty and its ancillary
commentary as the official cornerstone of the IITR motivated other
bodies to codify model tax treaties. Most notably, the U.N. Model
Treaty published initially in 1980 tried to offer an alternative to the
OECD tax hegemony by stressing the need for a fair return on foreign
investments in developing countries through fortifying and
104
broadening the applicability of the source principle. However, as
demonstrated below, with regard to the withholding tax treatment of
interest payments arising from inbound investments, the U.N.’s
103

OECD, Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, June 30, 1963.
104
U.N. Treaty, supra note 81, at vii, xi–xii (noting that the reasonableness of
reciprocal measures should be questioned when there is great disparity between the
initial negotiating positions of parties to treaties); Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra
note 23, at 393; Donald R. Whittaker, An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N.
Model Tax Treaties: History Provisions and Application to U.S. Foreign Policy, 8
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 39, 46 (1982) (attempting to solidify the U.N.’s
arguments in favor of source allocation); Irish, supra note 102, at 298–314 (providing
an illuminating analysis regarding the dynamics that lead countries to waive their
source taxing rights).
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professed ambition of creating a viable practical (or even conceptual)
105
alternative to the OECD model was met only on the margins. This
failure, in my opinion, is a direct result of the U.N. Model Treaty’s
attempt to attain redistributive objectives without first articulating a
coherent set of development goals that international taxation should
106
aspire to promote.
In 1976 the United States published its first model treaty, which,
as a matter of intentional design, followed the structure and wording
107
of the OECD model. The ambition to create a model treaty can be
explained as: (1) part of a longstanding U.S. trade policy to avoid
108
favoritism, (2) an expression of its disagreement with aspects of
various other model tax treaties (e.g., on the proper withholding tax
rate on interest and worldwide taxation of citizens), and (3) a way to
introduce its opinions on issues insufficiently addressed by the OECD
109
Model Treaty (e.g., treaty-shopping).
A comparison of section 11 of all three treaties, which deals with
the imposition of withholding taxes on interest, reveals that, besides
the recommended rate each treaty prescribes, there is little difference
110
in much of their wording and structure. While the OECD Model
Treaty prescribes a 10% withholding tax rate on interest payments,
the U.S. Model Treaty prescribes an interest exemption regime for
taxes at the source level. This is one of the few material differences
111
between the U.S. Model Treaty and the OECD benchmark. The

105

Willem F.G. Wijnen, Towards a New UN Model?, 52 BULL. INT’L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 135, 143 (1998) (raising the question of whether it makes sense to
maintain a separate U.N. Model Treaty project when only eight of its provisions were
actually embraced by a significant number of treaties).
106
U.N. Treaty, supra note 81, at xx–xxiii (2001) (failing to articulate the
distributive role international taxation should play in promoting and/or
conceptualizing international justice).
107
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 398 (“The most important
decision that has been made in designing the U.S. model was to adhere as closely as
possible to the OECD model. . . . [which] offers the best chance of achieving the
maximum degree of international tax harmonization, [and] the reduction of tax-based
barriers to the free movement of goods . . . .”).
108
Reese, supra note 77, at 392 (drawing a connecting policy rationale between
the U.S. Model Treaty and its trade-treaty policies — suggesting that in both cases the
United States seeks to reach a uniform treaty agreement with a broad range of
nations rather than entering into particular and diversified agreements with each
nation).
109
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 396.
110
KEES VAN RAAD, MODEL INCOME TAX TREATIES 38–42 (1990).
111
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 23, at 399.
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OECD Model Treaty’s recommended rate is relatively low, in
112
comparison to current prevalent statutory rates. It illustrates the
vigor of the notion that the main objective of the IITR during the
Trade Phase period was to remove tax obstacles to foreign debt
investments among developed countries. Such a low level of
withholding taxes on gross payments may still prove substantial in
highly leveraged sectors (e.g., the financial sector and, to a lesser
extent, the manufacturing sector) where gross interest flows are large.
One must remember that, unlike equity investment, the proceeds of
debt investment avoid the source (corporate) income tax completely.
The leniency in interest taxation is particularly evident with regards to
the United States, since its model treaty’s interest source exemption
does not provide even minimal support to the notion of source
113
country precedence.
The U.N. Model Treaty takes a somewhat awkward position and
does not recommend a specific withholding tax rate on interest (or on
dividend and royalty payments). This seems antithetical to its stated
ambition — to strengthen developing nations’ interests as source
countries. The U.N. group of experts recently reaffirmed this original
114
commitment “even in light of the global economy’s pressures.” Due
to gaps in bargaining power among developed (capital-exporting) and
developing (capital-importing) countries, one wonders why U.N.
Model Treaty drafters believed that leaving rate determinations to
parties’ negotiation would skew more revenue to the source
jurisdictions. Even in recent commentary, the U.N. failed to provide a
detailed account of what an equitable income tax source return for
115
116
inbound debt investment is.
As previously mentioned,
high
withholding taxes may have substantial negative externalities on the
inflow of debt investment. Given that the incidences of withholding
112

A few examples of OECD members: France has a 16% withholding tax that
may go up to 60% when the location of the creditor is not disclosed. C.G.I. art. 125-AIII, 990A-C. Germany and the United Kingdom impose a 20% withholding tax on
interest. EStG § 50 (7); Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 349 (2).
113
The OECD and U.S. Model treaties both exempt royalty payments from
withholding taxes. VAN RAAD, supra note 110, at 42–47. They both impose a 5%/15%
withholding tax rate on dividend payments to related/unrelated parties. Id. at 36–38.
114
U.N. Treaty, supra note 81, at xi–xii.
115
Id. at 168. The commentary claims that there are good reasons for reducing
the withholding tax costs on debt financing since the identity of the parties that bear
the tax is not clear. Combined with withholding taxes’ negative externalities on
investment inflow, the unclear incidence of the tax may indeed make it unworthy to
maintain for a developing country.
116
See supra Part IV.A.
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taxes’ burden may frequently be shifted to the debtors, it could well
be the case that higher than 10% withholding tax rates are not worth
maintaining. The problem with the U.N.’s position is its failure to
offer developing countries a robust analysis that provides the
analytical tools to determine the optimal withholding tax rate on
interest for their jurisdiction. Thus, in its decision to leave the
determination of actual rates to the parties, the U.N. Model Treaty
117
failed to provide developing countries with adequate guidance.
The manner by which all the abovementioned model treaties,
specifically the U.S. Model Treaty, tax lightly (or fail to tax) inbound
debt investments, is the best example of the manner in which trade
considerations erode the source tax base. The national need to attract
debt capital led nations to lower withholding tax rates on interest. The
thoroughgoing reduction is particularly troublesome because it makes
international debt investments appear much more lucrative from a tax
perspective. Since interest payments are deductible in the source
country, the exemption of interest payments from source taxes
opened a significant loophole for tax planners. As discussed below,
the fiscal losses and inequities of this loophole are particularly
problematic in the case of debt investments made by related parties,
which offer an easy and costless substitution for equity investments.
C. The Bank Deposit and Foreign Portfolio Income Statutory
Exemptions
Reciprocal treaty-based reductions in withholding tax rates do not
solely account for the erosion of the source income tax base regarding
interest payments from inbound investments. There are two
exemptions to U.S. sourced income that were “unilaterally”
incorporated by the United States into the Internal Revenue Code
(Code): the banking deposit and the foreign portfolio income
withholding tax exemptions. These unilateral tax reductions have
three common characteristics: (1) both appeal to interests of powerful
commercial lobbies, (2) both involve capital-elastic and, therefore,
118
tax-sensitive resources, which, in the absence of multinational

117

In practice, the major representative developing economies (e.g., China, India,
Indonesia, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Russia) maintain a mode
double taxation treaty withholding tax rate on interest of about 10% or slightly lower,
with some rare exceptions (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt) that maintain a mode
rate between 10% and 15%. See Tax Analysts, Worldwide Tax Treaties Database,
http://services.taxanalysts .com /taxbase/nav.nsf/WWTTFrame?Open&login.
118
Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56
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coordination among sovereigns, are the most natural candidates for
fierce tax competition, and (3) neither require that residence taxes be
laid on the source exempted income.
First, the bank deposit exemption: From its original enactment in
119
120
1936 to the present, in order “not unduly to hamper foreign
investments . . . of money and services [in the United States],”
withholding taxes excluded interest payments arising from foreigners’
121
bank deposits not effectively connected to a U.S. business’ income.
Through the years, such an exemption became prevalent among
122
practically all developed countries.
Second, the foreign portfolio income exemption: As part of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, a wide withholding taxes exemption
applied to interest income arising from inbound portfolio investments,
including bonds issued by the U.S. government, U.S. corporations,
123
and financial institutions. This exemption was part of an attempt to
facilitate better access by the U.S. public and private sectors to the
Eurobond market by reducing the burden on U.S. debtors via
124
decreased interest rates. The exemption also helped U.S. debtors

TAX L. REV. 537, 547–54 (2003) (providing the key distinctions between direct and
portfolio investments, and arguing that the latter are more volatile, short-term, and
responsive to bottom line returns and to financial markets).
119
See supra note 32.
120
I.R.C. § 871(i).
121
EHRENZWEIG & KOCH, supra note 67, ¶ 19.
122
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1581 tbl.1 (2000) (demonstrating that
with few exceptions all developing countries were exempting interest arising from
bank deposits in the 1990s).
123
I.R.C. § 881(c). The portfolio income exemption had one major exception:
section 881(c)(3)(A) excludes interest payments made to foreign banks from the
exemption. I.R.C. § 881(c)(3)(A); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1580 n.5
(arguing that this exclusion was made to protect the competitiveness of U.S. banks);
Bruce A. Elvin, The Recharacterization of Cross-Border Interest Rate Swaps: Tax
Consequences and Beyond, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 631, 643–44 (1995) (suggesting that swap
transactions open a wide array of options for bypassing the exclusion of interest paid
to foreign banks from the portfolio income exemptions).
124
DORON HERMAN, TAXING PORTFOLIO INCOME IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS — A POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 38
(2002) (suggesting that the comparative advantage of Eurobond lenders over their
domestic competitors is their ability to reduce tax liabilities and regulatory costs);
Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1580 (describing how the exemption resulted from a
fortuitous combination of (1) the U.S. deficit following the 1981 Reagan
administration tax reform, and (2) the shutdown of the Netherlands Antilles finance
subsidiaries tax planning avenues); James P. Holden, Jr., Repeal of the Withholding
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meet the anonymity and net-return obligations of those markets. Put
differently, the high demand for portfolio bond investment supplied
by the Eurobond markets allowed bond issuers operating in them to
shift the withholding tax burden to the debtors. The tax exemption
should therefore be understood as the U.S. government’s response to
domestic business (and deficit reduction) pressures by accepting the
“net interest rate standard” of the Eurobond markets to better
compete for these capital resources.
However, enactment of the portfolio income (source) tax
exemption regime resulted in a myriad of unwanted avoidance and
evasion complexities, both associated with a need to identify the true
126
fiscal residency of the bond holder.
Furthermore, the U.S.’s
unilateral exemption led to a tax-competitive chain reaction by which
all major economies abolished withholding taxes on interest arising
from inbound portfolio investments to avoid migration of capital
127
resources to the United States.
The withholding tax exemption granted to interest income
originating from inbound portfolio investments is perhaps the best
example of source tax harmonization that is enforced by a taxcompetitive dynamic. To date, the exemption of portfolio income has
diminished the revenue generation of the U.S. withholding tax on
interest so profoundly that serious doubts have arisen as to whether
maintaining the withholding tax on foreign investments is a
128
worthwhile endeavor.
In examining the foreign portfolio income exemption, it is
important to recognize the pivotal role that double taxation treaty
principles played in paving the way. As one commentator put it: “[The
Tax on Portfolio Debt Interest Paid to Foreigners: Tax and Fiscal Policies in the
Context of Eurobond Financing, 5 VA. TAX REV. 375, 393 (1985) (“First, but not
necessarily foremost, Congress wanted U.S. business and the U.S. Treasury to have
efficient access to foreign capital. Second, Congress wanted to assure such access
without creating any significant tax compliance problems.”).
125
Holden, supra note 124, at 383.
126
Marilyn D. Franson, The Repeal of the Thirty Percent Withholding Tax on
Portfolio Interest Paid to Foreign Investors, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 930 (1984)
(discussing the problems of limiting the exemption only to portfolio interest and to
nonresidents); Holden, supra note 124, at 415 (claiming that Congress enacted the
exemption without fully accepting the avoidance costs that broad access to the
Eurobond market would entail).
127
Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1581; Franson, supra note 126, at 976
(describing how France and West Germany repealed their withholding taxes on
interest to compete successfully with the United States).
128
Colon, supra note 76, at 843–44.
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portfolio income exemption] legislation supports the longstanding
principle of international taxation that portfolio investors should be
subject to taxation on interest income [only] in their own country of
129
residence or nationality.”
D. The Trade Phase: Some Final Observations
One has to recognize that international trade and IITR
considerations coincided during the Trade Phase to promote
liberalization of international markets and international commerce.
This fusion resulted in a conceptual spillover of international trade
considerations into the realm of IITR — one that was not balanced by
coherent source tax equity standards. As IITR revenues comprised a
relatively small fraction of developed countries’ tax mix during the
Trade Phase, the trade liberalization considerations had tremendous
impact on the development of the IITR during that crucial era.
This spillover would have been less disturbing to some countries if
reductions in withholding taxes on interest were compensated for by
higher taxation on the residence frontier (in which it is assumed that
130
the worldwide income of residents is taxed). However, revenue
131
reciprocity seems to be impaired beyond rescue in light of the
current flourish of loosely taxed and regulated financial offshore
centers along with the development of sophisticated deferral,
inversion, and tax avoidance techniques by tax planners. These
phenomena are related to taxpayer ability to shift and manipulate
holdings of mobile financial (and intangible) assets to foreign
jurisdictions. The accelerating mobility of assets during the last fifty
years is an inevitable byproduct of a number of overall positive
developments, including the overall pro-capitalist political stability in
Western
countries,
technological
and
telecommunication
129

Franson, supra note 126, at 972.
Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury: The “Enhancement” of § 163(j) and the
Tax Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 283–84
(1994) (noting that the United States refrained from entering tax treaties with
jurisdictions that will not adequately tax the proceeds of passive income on a
residence basis).
131
Perhaps most indicative of the reciprocity notion’s conceptual deficiency is the
growing readiness of policymakers to favorably consider the shift to a territorial
system. HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
INCOME (2001) (concluding that exempting repatriated income would greatly simplify
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and may even yield more revenues than the
current regime); see also FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON
FEDERAL TAX REFORM 103–04, 133–35 (2005).
130
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advancements, and the expansion of international financial markets
and intermediaries, which allowed taxpayers to locate intangible
assets in one jurisdiction while controlling them from another.
Accordingly, tax-motivated inversion techniques involve changes in
citizenship or residency status by wealthy individuals or corporations
132
from high-tax rate jurisdictions to those with lower effective rates.
Deferral techniques involve sheltering income in foreign subsidiaries
133
thus avoiding taxation until realization based repatriation. Tax
evasion arises from taxpayer ability to invest financial holdings in
source jurisdictions that impose null or negligible tax rates, without
134
reporting earnings to residence jurisdictions. Avoidance techniques
typically involve related party dealings to shift income to low-tax
jurisdictions, the use of hybrid entities to repatriate excessive foreign
135
tax credits, and/or the manipulation of financial and intangible asset
holdings in an effort to create artificial losses in high-tax
136
jurisdictions. While solutions have been conceptually established,
and partially employed, to redress problems of evasion (through
information sharing), inversion (through re-characterization rules),
137
and deferral (through anti-deferral CFC legislation), the problem of
avoidance remains an open wound within the IITR.
Reduction of withholding taxes is not unique to the United States;
to the contrary, it is probably more significant in the European Union
138
(EU).
The United States, however, is an interesting example
132

Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing
the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 415
(2002).
133
See generally Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign
Tax Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391 (2003).
134
See HERMAN, supra note 124, at 275–77, 428; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note
118, at 578–82.
135
See Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals
May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike),
59 SMU L. REV. 751, 759–63 (2006) (showing how MNEs use hybrid entities for
importing tax-credits).
136
See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Understanding Long Term Capital, 106 TAX
NOTES 681 (Feb. 7, 2005) (providing an elaborate example of such manipulation).
137
But see Yesim Yilmaz, Tax Havens, Tax Competition, and Economic
Performance, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 587, 590 (Aug. 14, 2006) (challenging the
effectiveness of this anti-deferral regime and claiming that holding hybrid entities in
tax havens are used by U.S. MNEs to reduce the tax liabilities of their foreign
subsidiaries while avoiding exposure to subpart F liabilities).
138
To promote the four freedoms of people, goods, services, and capital mobility,
the EU enacted directives that disallow the imposition of withholding taxes between
related parties in Member States. See, e.g., Council Directive 03/49, Common System
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because it illustrates the different techniques through which (stable)
trade conventions were pursued under changing circumstances.
Looking at U.S. IITR policy during the Trade Phase, one could break
down reductions of source withholding taxes on inbound debt
investments as a gradual shift from the notion of neutrality to the
139
notion of competition. At the beginning of the Trade Phase, the
United States acted in the capacity of a creditor country. Thus, as
mentioned, it promoted a capital-export neutrality policy, which
assumed that proceeds from financial investments are taxed by
residence jurisdictions. The capital-export neutrality was thus good,
not only for liberalizing international trade and investment markets,
but for the Treasury as well. At the end of the Trade Phase, the
140
United States, in its capacity as a debtor and later as a net-debtor,
unilaterally reduced its withholding taxes to attract investment. In
sharp contrast with notions of capital-export neutrality, the
competitive process of converting foreign investors from a source of
revenue to a source of credit did not require reciprocal tax reductions
on behalf of other tax regimes. Paradoxically, as the United States
shifted from being “the” net capital-exporting country to a major netcapital-importing country, it was motivated by the same
considerations that led net capital-importing countries at the
beginning of the Trade Phase to swim along the withholding tax
erosion current, despite subsequent fiscal loss.
The shift in the United States’ position flags an important
distinction between the beginning and the end of the Trade Phase: the
role of tax-competition. In a sense, the initial decision of net capitalimporting countries to comply with the Treaty’s norms, which dictated
erosion of withholding taxes, was a form of tax-competition intended

of Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made Between Associated
Companies of Different Member States, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (EC); Council Directive
90/435, Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies
and Subsidiaries of Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 (EEC).
139
Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 324–34 (arguing that U.S. international tax policy
should be divided into four periods and identifying two post-WWII periods; the first
lasting until the beginning of the 1980s, which emphasized capital export neutrality,
and the second lasting from the beginning of the 1980s until the late 1990s, which was
dominated by competition considerations).
140
During the second half of the 1970s, the United States maintained a net-debt
exporting balance (around USD 16 billion). It became a net-debtor in 1984 (USD 32
billion). Its position as a net-debtor increased dramatically in 1985 (USD 151 billion)
and 1989 (USD 281 billion). To date, the United States is a net-debtor of USD 1,993
billion. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Investment Position of the
United States at Yearend, 1976-2005 (2005), http://bea.gov/bea/di/intinv05_t2.xls.
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to attract foreign direct investments (FDI). FDIs are typically
strategic, long-term investments by corporations in a line of business
141
in a certain country. Thus, from a capital-importing country’s
perspective, attracting FDIs by signing a double taxation treaty with a
capital-exporting country was a cautious way to maximize investment
in its jurisdiction without completely eroding its withholding tax base.
Although the volume and magnitude of FDIs are increasing
significantly and constantly as the global economy continues to
integrate, this growth has been overshadowed by the meteoric growth
142
of portfolio investment in modern global financial markets.
Portfolio investments are made by individuals and corporations
seeking a diversified portfolio of financial assets and a high (net)
return on their investments — not control of a specific entity. These
investments are volatile, mobile, and dispersed among various types of
143
investors originating from different countries. All of the above
attributes make portfolio investments more sensitive to tax than FDIs.
Accordingly, as portfolio investors and markets grew in size and
sophistication, portfolio investors were able to utilize capital mobility
to shift the withholding tax burden to their debtors. To tax-compete
successfully for these investments, the United States had to make a
strong commitment to broad foreign portfolio income exemptions.
This change in strategy is a direct result of material changes in
international investment markets. Nevertheless, thematically, both
strategies ascribe to Trade Phase rationales.
At the beginning of the Trade Phase one commentator wrote:
[A]ny special provisions for the promotion of trade . . . would
entail some loss of revenue in certain cases and, in certain
other cases, it might permit [sic] manipulation. . . . [However,
s]ave in cases of abuse, if this country wants foreign trade, it
should be prepared to pay some reasonable premium to get
144
it.
This commentator was correct. He failed to foresee, however, that
in the absence of an IITR source equity paradigm, there was no
indication as to what “reasonable premium” meant in terms of
141

See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 118, at 549–52 (discussing the ambiguous
empirical evidence for portfolio investments’ tax sensitivity).
142
See id. at 542–45 (detailing the growth of U.S taxpayers’ outbound portfolio
investments since the beginning of the 1990s).
143
Id. at 549.
144
James, supra note 32, at 246.
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revenues. On a conceptual level, the absence of such a paradigm
disabled tax policymakers from discerning when trade considerations
infringed key normative tax considerations. The subsequent AntiAvoidance Phase represents a convoluted and, to a large extent,
unsuccessful attempt to identify those principles.
V. THE EARNINGS-STRIPPING LOOPHOLE AND THE ANTIAVOIDANCE PHASE: LATE 1980S TO 2000S
The third era this article defines, the Anti-Avoidance Phase,
marks an attempt by IITR policymakers to balance considerations
emphasized during the Trade Phase by developing mechanisms to recharacterize the tax consequences of tax abusive transactions. The
article argues that this attempt failed because it was conceptually
inapt to deal with sourcing difficulties that arise from an integrated
global market reality. During the Anti-Avoidance Phase, evasion
opportunities associated with the growth of the international portfolio
investment markets and the availability of loosely taxed and regulated
145
financial centers also emerged as a major avenue of revenue loss.
The main difference between the avoidance and evasion topics is that,
in the case of tax evasion, policymakers conceptually resolved the
146
proper methods for dealing with it (e.g., information sharing) —
147
therefore making it a problem of incomplete implementation. This

145

See generally Yilmaz, supra note 137.
MITCHELL B. CARROLL, PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
AND FISCAL EVASION: TWO DECADES OF PROGRESS UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
37 (1939) (exemplifying that the solution was already known in the 1930s).
147
The OECD took measures to establish these methods by threatening to
implement a set of multilateral sanctions against tax-havens (through bank and
corporate secrecy laws, noninformation sharing policies, etc.) that jeopardized its
Members’ residency taxation. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998); OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001); OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS (2000); see also
DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, THE GREAT AMERICAN TAX DODGE 51–
117 (2000) (giving a detailed account of how American taxpayers use offshore
facilities to evade taxation and how the use of the internet made it difficult for the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) to prevent this abuse); Abadan Jasmon & Junaid
M. Shaikh, Underreporting Income: Should Financial Institutions Disclose Customers’
Income to Tax Authorities?, 15 J. INT’L TAX’N 36, 40–42 (2004) (suggesting options for
effective enforcement); David E. Spencer, OECD Project on Tax Havens and
Harmful Tax Practices: An Update (Part 2), 13 J. INT’L TAX’N 32, 41–45 (2002);
Suzanne Walsh, Note, Taxation of Cross-Border Interest Flows: The Promises and
146
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Part focuses on the topic of tax avoidance because countering the
problems associated with it requires first a more profound
conceptualization of the issues at stake.
In the previous Part, the article presented how the Trade Phase
assumption (that lower source taxation would result in more residence
taxation) failed because the economics of investment markets enabled
the tax planning industry to develop deferral and avoidance
techniques. By the same token, the article argues that the assumption
underlying the Anti-Avoidance Phase, which contemplates that
abusive tax-motivated transactions could be separated from ordinary
business transactions, is nullified by high volumes of affiliated
transactions within MNEs. The following Part makes this point by
examining the manner in which the USESR failed to adequately
source affiliated-party inbound debt investments.
In the 1990s, on the verge of entering the post-Cold War period,
which was characterized by a lack of any serious anti-capitalist
political competition, fiscal regimes in the developed world faced the
following two issues: (1) free trade cross-border practices (including
liberalization of monetary and financial policies and omission of
protectionist barriers to investment) had, as a matter of course,
become so prevalent that they could almost be taken for granted and
(2) the increasing integration and accessibility of international
markets entailed considerable tax avoidance costs. Tax avoidance
opportunities were most frequently associated with MNEs. Given the
slowdown in the growth of post-WWII economies and the growing
148
role of MNEs in the global economy, policymakers feared that the
tax avoidance costs of promoting free trade would eventually
jeopardize the core expenditure programs of liberal democracies’
149
welfare states.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was a focus on the
attainment of Trade Phase political objectives, thus increasing
concerns regarding the solidity of public finance schemes as an
150
indispensable component of a stable (capitalist) world order. Such
Failures of the European Union Approach, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2005);
Douglas J. Workman, Comment, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of
Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 686–706
(1982) (demonstrating that incomplete implementation is not a new phenomenon).
148
Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of
Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK J. INT’L L. 1261, 1269–71 (2001).
149
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1632–39.
150
See Emilio Cencerrado, Controlled Foreign Company and Thin Capitalization
Rules Are Not Applicable in Spain to Entities Resident in the European Union, 13 EC
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changes in the global political economy dimmed the then
unchallenged brightness of the notion that trade considerations were
supreme. The notion that trade considerations should be limited in
certain cases is a mark of the Anti-Avoidance Phase paradigm. It thus
prioritizes the need to counter tax avoidance options open to
taxpayers with international operations, mainly MNEs.
Fiscal avoidance is possible whenever legal form is inconsistent
with economic substance. In the course of looking for ways to retrieve
the integrity of their fiscal regimes, IITR policymakers recognized
that the inherent complexities of financial transactions, as well as the
possibility of using numerous different contractual avenues to attain
similar results, make it very difficult to create and implement precise
rules. However, tax authorities’ efforts to delineate broad antiavoidance rules have often been successfully challenged, politically
and legally, by taxpayers on the basis that the rules are arbitrary.
There are many mechanisms that are consistent with the antiavoidance paradigm’s premise. Unlike the previous, broader
discussions of the Trade and Revenue Phases, the Anti-Avoidance
Phase requires a narrower discussion focused on an examination of
only one representative example. Accordingly, after briefly explaining
the difficulties of sourcing debt investments and their susceptibility to
avoidance schemes, the article’s next Part focuses on what it considers
to be the best representative example: MNEs’ ability to shift income
by related party lending — a phenomenon known as “earningsstripping.” More specifically, the article focuses on the USESR as a
case study that demonstrates the problems of the Anti-Avoidance
Phase. Dealing with the attempt to prevent abusive intra-group
finance transactions within MNEs, the USESR example epitomizes
the difficulties associated with the anti-avoidance paradigm’s
premises.
A. The Difficulty of Sourcing Interest and the Earnings-Stripping
Practice
The international tax terrain, which entails the difficulty of
formulating robust interest allocation rules, can be understood as
consisting of two different components: (1) the different tax rates and
sourcing techniques that apply to debt and equity instruments and (2)
the tax-competitive global environment in which tax policymakers
operate.

TAX REV. 102, 107–08 (2004) (making a somewhat similar argument).
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First, the proceeds from equity investments are typically subject
to two layers of taxation (corporate and shareholder). In contrast,
proceeds from debt investments are subject to one tax only — on the
creditor level (due to the deductibility of interest expenses on the
corporate level). In addition, the bilateral treaty network has
facilitated a (de facto) acknowledgment that source countries should
enjoy a much stronger claim on income derived from equity than from
151
debt investments. The combination of these two factors reveals the
prima facie appeal of related-debt financing due to potential
jurisdictional mismatches between the locations where interest
deductions and proceeds are recognized. By leveraging operations in
high-tax jurisdictions and borrowing from low-taxed lenders,
taxpayers may take advantage of interest expense deductibility and
negligible withholding tax on interest to reduce finance costs. This
possibility is especially lucrative for MNEs, which can engage in
related-debt transactions to finance subsidiaries in high-tax
jurisdictions while retaining corporate control. This practice is called
earnings-stripping.
This loophole is central to this Part’s analysis and therefore an
example with a graphic schema (Figure 3) may help to better illustrate
it. Country A and Country B impose respectively a 0% and 50% ETR
on all sources of corporate income. Country A and Country B then
enter a double taxation treaty, which eliminates withholding taxes on
interest payments. X and Y are two subsidiaries of a single MNE that
are located in Country A and Country B, respectively. In a given year,
Y earned $100 from its business activities in Country B, which would
be subject to a 50% tax rate leading to a tax liability of $50. The MNE
has a clear incentive to reduce its overall tax expenses. This could
easily be done by financing Y’s activities with X’s debt instruments.
For instance, subsidiary X loans subsidiary Y $1000 carrying the
appropriate market rate of 10% annual interest. Y deducts the $100
interest payments from its income and X, which is tax indifferent
because of Country A’s low ETR, will report them as income. This
way Y’s income for that year would be $0 and the MNE would avoid
$50 of source tax costs that would have been laid on Y by Country B.

151

Axel Cordewener, Company Taxation, Cross-Border Financing and Thin
Capitalization in the EU Internal Market: Some Comments on Lankhorst-Hohorst
GmbH, 43 EUR. TAX’N 102, 113 (2003); see also Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note
15, at 646 (noting that under some treaties the withholding tax on dividends and
corporate distributions is usually not eliminated but only reduced to 5%-15%, while
passive interest income is usually exempt).
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FIGURE 3. THE EARNINGS-STRIPPING TECHNIQUE

Country A: 0% ETR on corporate
income

Subsidiary X:
(creditor)
$100 profits
$(-0) taxes paid
$100 taxable
income

$1000
Debt investment

$100 Deductible
interest payments

Subsidiary Y:
(debtor)
$100 profits
$(-100) interest exps.
$ 0 taxable income

MNE
Parent

Country B: 50% ETR
on corporate income

The Earnings-Stripping
Problem
Conditions:
•
The three conditions of
a jurisdiction mismatch:
o
Difference in
effective source
corporate tax rates
o
Low or negligible
withholding tax
rates
o
Payments that,
like interest, are
tax deductible
•
Affiliation between
creditor and debtor

Second, sovereigns, conflicted between attracting foreign
investments and protecting revenue streams, try to reduce the
effective tax burden on capital without piercing their tax nets too
severely. In this context, the fact that the Anti-Avoidance Phase took
place after all major developed countries reduced effective tax rates to
152
create more competitive economies reveals an interesting insight.
Anti-avoidance measures could be encapsulated as supplementary
mechanisms intended to keep the tax rate reductions of the mid-1980s
to1990s (that were accompanied by tax base broadening) within the
original intended framework of revenue neutrality. Through their
crude and somewhat arbitrary nature, anti-avoidance measures were
intended to cap losses from revenue. Using anti-avoidance
mechanisms, tax authorities aspired to balance revenue losses arising
from deliberate tax reductions, including withholding taxes on capital
income, with the political necessity of adhering to the unsound
foundations of transfer-pricing and treaty based sourcing regimes.
152

Jacques Sasseville, Current Issues in International Tax Policy, in TAX
TREATIES: LINKAGES BETWEEN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DYNAMIC NONMEMBER ECONOMIES 9 (Richard Vann ed., 1997) (arguing that in the 1980s and 1990s
Western countries changed their strategies for attracting investments; instead of
offering tax breaks they tried to make their tax systems more neutral and competitive
through tax rate reductions and tax base broadenings).
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Treaty sourcing mechanisms were explained at great length in the
previous Part. The next Part will critically describe some key aspects
of the transfer-pricing sourcing regime.
B. The Inadequacy of Sourcing Mechanisms in Protecting the Tax
Base’s Integrity from Earnings-Stripping Practices
It is crucial to first understand what earnings-stripping practice is
and why ordinary sourcing conventions provide unsatisfactory results
when dealing with it.
At their core, the problems associated with interest sourcing and
earnings-stripping are a byproduct of the following two notions. The
first notion is that MNEs should have the freedom to arrange their
capital structure. A derivative of this is that related party debt is a
completely legitimate finance option in pursuing various business
153
objectives. The reluctance of MNEs to disclose sensitive information
to creditors or to tie capital to specific locations are only two of an
array of legitimate business reasons for MNEs to engage in relateddebt (rather than equity) financing for any related entity, regardless of
its creditworthiness. The second notion stresses the idea that, from an
economic perspective, a debt transaction between entities under
154
common control “is ultimately just a piece of paper” — very
155
different from debt obligations issued to unrelated parties. The core
of the anti-avoidance problem in the earnings-stripping case is about
how to reconcile the two notions. The underlying theme of the AntiAvoidance Phase is that tax authorities could attain the institutional
competence to separate related finance transactions with legitimate
tax consequences from those with illegitimate ones.
Unsurprisingly, many of the ordinary sourcing rules developed
during the Trade Phase have limited capacity to protect the integrity
of the interest tax base in light of the abovementioned pressures. As a
prologue to its detailed discussion of the U.S. earnings-stripping
regime as a case study, this article briefly examines the sourcing
difficulties arising from two mechanisms that directly relate to source
interest tax base erosion: (1) the arm’s-length standard and (2)
limitation-of-benefits clauses (in treaties) and anti-conduit legislation.
153

T. James Brooks, Why It Would Be Premature to Tighten U.S. Earnings
Stripping Rules, 33 TAX NOTES INT’L 1017, 1023 (Mar. 15, 2004).
154
H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections,
Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 17 (2004).
155
Id. (“The hallmark of debt is an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain
on demand or at a fixed maturity in the reasonably foreseeable future . . . .”).

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC

680

4/14/2008 12:05 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:631

First, the arm’s-length standard is the key sourcing technique
through which tax authorities source related party transactions.
Generally, the arm’s-length standard is a transaction-based approach
156
employing a hypothetical inquiry as to how unrelated parties would
price a certain transaction, requiring each corporate entity within a
157
MNE group to report accordingly. However, the arm’s-length
standard, as it is currently enshrined in a plethora of transfer-pricing
158
regulations, is a mechanism that is conceptually flawed, practically
159
160
inept, and extremely inefficient and burdensome for sourcing
many complex affiliated transactions.
156

Id. at 27 (arguing that hypothetical tests are needed for any operational
income tax system because contractual fictions allow many situations in which
transactions cannot be accepted at face value).
157
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 46–47 (1993); Joann M. Weiner,
U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Paper Considers States’ Experience Regarding
Formula Apportionment, 1999 WTD 182-23 (Sept. 21, 1999).
158
As a business structure, MNEs flourish in those industries where the
integrated multi-jurisdictional group structure enables them to internalize efficiently a
variety of the group’s (collective) costs — such as transaction costs, research and
development costs, information obtaining costs, and management costs. Hence, tax
authorities find it difficult to directly assign MNEs’ collective costs and profits to any
specific corporate entity operating in a certain jurisdiction. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International
Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 149–50 (1995); Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective
Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS 208, 221 (1985); James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of
Multinational Corporations 34–38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 5589, 1996), available at http://econpapers.hhs.se/ paper/nbrnberwo/5589.htm.
159
The arm’s-length standard’s endorsement by all tax regimes motivates MNEs
to restructure their affiliated transactions’ contractual prices to report profits in
corporations located in low-tax jurisdictions (MNEs may also be motivated to report
profits in high-tax corporations, which have generated deductible losses about to
expire). This tax reduction opportunity, open to MNEs through their range of
international entities, enables them to curtail their tax expenses without instituting
any fundamental alteration in the economic nature of their activities.
160
In an attempt to prevent the possibilities for abuse that arise from these
conceptual deficiencies, transfer-pricing regulations often oblige MNEs to meet
superficial (yet burdensome and rigorous) documentation standards in relation to
their intra-group pricing methods. However, because of their incongruence with
economic reality of integrated MNEs, transfer-pricing rules have a penumbra of
abuse possibilities and uncertainties, which breed litigation and embroil the arm’slength standard with inherent inequities. See Towards and Internal Market Without
Tax Obstacles, A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities, at 40, COM (2001) 582 final (Oct. 23,
2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_
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In the related party finance realm, it is virtually impossible for tax
authorities to unveil and systemize MNEs’ financial structures
according to the arm’s-length standard. Pricing the “proper” interest
rate of a specific related-debt transaction is a feasible task for the tax
authorities of developed countries. However, tax authorities have no
conceptual benchmark to determine whether the debt form of the
transaction is proper, given the numerous alternatives available to
taxpayers for mobilizing and repackaging fungible capital assets. This
sourcing difficulty is compounded by the general difficulty of overly
formalistic tax rules in dealing with sophisticated financial instruments
according to obsolete debt versus equity distinctions. In light of these
factors, it is evident that the arm’s-length standard is incapable of
coherently sourcing affiliated financial transactions because there is
no one “correct” and objective standard for allocating financial
161
risks. Since it may be both analytically and practically difficult to
retrieve the true economic substance of many affiliated financial
transactions, MNEs may, through contractual machinations, skew the
risks associated with those transactions (and their correlative returns)
to favorable tax jurisdictions, even when no real economic risks are
undertaken in those jurisdictions. As one prominent scholar has put it,
the arm’s-length standard’s prima facie endorsement of affiliated
transactions’ risk allocation schemes resulted in a “tax-planning free
162
for all [regime].”
Second, in what has become known as treaty-shopping,
sophisticated taxpayers are able to avoid unfavorable withholding
taxes levied upon payments to nonresidents by channeling financial
flows through conduit entities in jurisdictions with a favorable treaty

0582en01.pdf (stating that there is evidence for aggressive transfer-pricing practices of
both MNEs and tax authorities); Company Taxation in the Internal Market, at 261,
268 SEC (2001) 1681 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/resources/documents/company_tax_study_en.pdf (noting that business sector
representatives claim that the compliance burden of transfer-pricing and its ongoing
incidents of double taxation are major IITR obstacles).
161
Gary D. Sprague, Application of Transfer Pricing Rules to Branches and
Permanent Establishments — Electronic Commerce and Intangible Property Aspects,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 988 (2002).
162
Richard J. Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm’s-Length
Principle, in THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES 142 (Brian
J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville & Erick M. Zolt eds., 2003) (arguing, brilliantly, that the
embedment of functional value creating factors within the transfer-pricing regimes,
which was meant to retrieve economic substance, resulted in providing MNEs with
great latitude to contractually allocate risks to low-tax jurisdictions to reduce their tax
liability).
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163

network. This way, taxpayers are able to extend withholding tax
reductions, attained through such “treaty-havens,” to entities in
164
jurisdictions with more conservative treaty policies. In response to
these perceived abuses of the treaty network, it has become a
common practice for some nations, most notably the United States, to
165
include in their treaties a limitation-of-benefits clause. These clauses
deal with situations in which nonresidents of the other signatory to the
double taxation treaty disguise themselves as residents to attain treaty
166
benefits. The United States has supplemented its treaty-shopping
treaties’ provisions with an anti-conduit statutory legislation intended
to counter conduit transactions that do not require creating a related
167
entity.
While both policies have been integrated in U.S.
163

These practices are facilitated mainly through developed countries with
extensive treaty-networks (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). MNEs
and other international equity and debt investors may create a conduit entity in such
“treaty-havens” to transfer funds through them.
164
For example, assume X is a corporation that resides in a country that has a
double taxation treaty with the United Kingdom that eliminates withholding taxes.
X’s country of residence does not have a double taxation treaty with the United
States. X wants to provide a loan to an American corporation. If interest payments
are paid directly to X from the American corporation, they will be subject to 30%
withholding tax. However, if X establishes a U.K. subsidiary, invests the proceeds
from the loan in that subsidiary, and then lends the money to the American
corporation, interest payments made to the U.K. subsidiary by the American
corporations would, absent an anti-treaty-shopping provision, be exempt from
withholding tax rates under the 2003 version of the Treaty — even though they would
eventually be redirected to X. More sophisticated versions of treaty-shopping are
executed typically through the use of conduit companies, agency or trust
arrangements, or the use of swap financial instruments, which divert the benefits of
the payments from the resident (eligible for the reduced withholding tax rate) to a
nonresident.
165
See, e.g., Treasury Dep’t, United States Model Income Tax Convention, art.
22, Sept. 20, 1996, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 212.22; ISENBERGH, supra note 77, at 245–
46; Tillinghast, supra note 81, at 465–66 (noting that having a limitation of benefits
provision has become “an inflexible U.S. demand in negotiation of any treaty”).
166
Limitation-of-benefits provisions are directed to counter conduit transactions
made through corporate entities as well as agency and trust relationships. These
provisions rely on ownership benchmarks, the nature of the business activity
undertaken by the entities, and the tax avoidance purpose of the transactions. See
United States Model Income Tax Convention, supra note 165, art. 22.
167
I.R.C. § 7701(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (1995); Timothy S. Guenther, Tax
Treaties and Overrides: The Multiple-Party Financing Dilemma, 16 VA. TAX REV. 645,
661–63 (1997) (explaining the main attributes of the conduit regulations); Tillinghast,
supra note 81, at 463. The regulations counter financing transactions, which are part
of a tax avoidance plan to reduce withholding taxes through intermediated entities
even if those entities are not related to either the financing or financed entities. The
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international tax policy, doubt has risen over their effective
168
169
enforcement in light of high negotiation costs, complexity, and
enormous information-finding and litigation costs not available to tax
170
authorities.
Although the problems associated with conduit
transactions apply to all taxpayers, the mechanisms developed to
counter them are less effective when dealing with MNEs. Large
MNEs typically have real economic activities in many treaty-havens
and a difficult to trace transactional network with various financial
institutions.
C. The (Counter) Earnings-Stripping Regimes
1. Two Approaches for Filtering Abusive Related Debt
In discussing earnings-stripping (or thin-capitalization as it is
called outside the United States) the OECD has emphasized two
common approaches to uncover inappropriate related-debt
171
transactions. The first is an arm’s-length standard approach, in
which the earnings-stripping regime’s interest deduction limitation is
triggered when it is determined that a specific related-debt transaction
would not have been undertaken by unrelated parties. This approach
confronts potentially inappropriate transactions through cumbersome,
case-by-case evidentiary inquiries. The multifactor, hypothetical

simplest example of such transaction would be a back-to-back loan. See id. at 463. In
this scenario a foreign lender passes funds to a (related or unrelated) borrower
through a financial institution that is a resident of the jurisdiction that has favorable
treaties with both the lender and borrower’s jurisdictions. The financial institution
receives a deposit of a certain amount from the lender and shortly after lends a similar
amount to the depositor. The interest rate and duration of both debt contracts are
similar and the financial institution will typically have some type of recourse against
the lender to insure against the debtor’s credit risk. This allows the lender and the
debtor to avoid withholding taxes and leaves the financial institution with a relatively
small, yet costless, profit. In the absence of a smoking gun, it is doubtful whether
back-to-back transactions could be spotted effectively by tax authorities.
168
Colon, supra note 76, at 821–22, 829 (noting that the treaty-shopping problem
was only settled in the extremely long limitation of benefits provision in the United
States’ double taxation treaty with the Netherlands; it took the countries twelve years
of negotiation to resolve the controversies arising from the ambiguity of the limitation
of treaty benefits provision).
169
ISENBERGH, supra note 77, at 254 (noting that the most primitive practice of
earnings-stripping tax planning survives the anti-conduit legislation).
170
Tillinghast, supra note 81, at 461.
171
OECD, THIN CAPITALISATION, TAXATION OF ENTERTAINERS, ARTISTES AND
SPORTSMEN 29–31 (1987).
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nature of this inquiry narrows significantly the idea of inappropriate
debt to include, exclusively, related-debt transactions with terms
172
inconsistent with a debtor’s credit rating.
Under the second “ratio approach,” the interest deduction
limitation is triggered once a relevant party fails to meet a certain
debt-equity safe-harbor ratio. This ratio could be designed to focus on
the debtor’s total indebtedness or its indebtedness against a specific
173
related shareholder’s portfolio.
The OECD’s absolute adherence to the arm’s-length standard, as
174
the sole sourcing methodology of affiliated transactions, could be
understood, in part, by its concern that anti-avoidance sourcing
mechanisms will pave the way for discriminatory tax treatment of
foreign inbound debt investments and investors. As discussed earlier,
a key objective of treaties is to prevent tax discrimination of source
175
jurisdictions against foreigners. In the earnings-stripping context,
there is an almost-explicit invalidation of this norm, since the heavier
tax burden is directly targeted at domestic entities with foreign
176
shareholder-creditors.

172

See generally Tim Edgar, The Thin Capitalization Rules: Role and Reform, 40
CAN. TAX J. 1, 30 (1992).
173
Ruud A. Sommerhalder, Approaches to Thin Capitalization, 36 EUR. TAX’N
82, 83 (1996) (providing some examples of countries implementing this type of debtratio).
174
OECD, supra note 171, at 29–32.
175
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 24, Jan. 28,
2003 (prohibiting a number of scenarios in which the source country may discriminate
against nationals of another country that reside in it, permanent establishments, and
enterprises owned by foreigners).
176
The OECD’s position on earnings-stripping aligns with its general aversion to
any sourcing arrangement that may grant the source jurisdiction the right to
differentiate enterprises related to foreign investors from domestic investors. It is
feared that if the source states will be granted the right to make such differentiation, it
would allow them to expropriate taxes in an unaccountable and inequitable manner.
One other important aspect of this aversion is the adherence of the OECD to the
arm’s-length standard principle. To a large extent, this is driven by the fear that
source jurisdictions will misuse formulary systems to allocate income in an unjust
manner. Fred C. de Hosson & Geerten M.M. Michielse, Treaty Aspects of the ‘Thin
Capitalisation’ Issue — A Review of the OECD Report, 11 INTERTAX 476, 484 (1989)
(criticizing the earnings-stripping regimes as violating anti-discrimination treaty
obligations); Jack M. Mintz, Globalization of the Corporate Income Tax: The Role of
Allocation, 56 FINANZARCHIV 388, 393–94 (1999) (discussing the issue of tax
expropriation through formulary allocation methods).
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Whether specific earnings-stripping regimes violate treaty anti177
discrimination norms is a complicated discussion. That discussion is
not covered in detail here because it is relevant primarily to questions
178
dealing with the hierarchy of treaty law and national legislation.
Thus, it contributes less to the inquiry of this article regarding the
179
intellectual undercurrents affecting interest taxation.
2. The Nature of the Interest Deduction Limitation
The first form of limitation, often criticized as being most likely to
180
result in double taxation, is disallowance of interest deductions.
Interest deduction disallowance results in the recognition of more
income on the source (corporate) level while interest payments are
presumably subject to tax on the foreign shareholder-creditor’s level
as well. A more lenient version of this form is to defer the deduction
of disallowed interest. The second option is the re-characterization of
interest payments to related parties as dividends. Under this system,
payments are subject to source (corporate) tax. Double taxation is
thus avoided only if tax authorities in the shareholder-creditor’s
181
country of residence endorse the re-characterization by granting
relief for extra taxes paid on the source level. The shareholder-

177

It involves questions of legislative versus treaty priority and questions of
legislative interpretation.
178
See discussion infra note 223.
179
Forceful arguments that (for tax purposes) foreign (debt) investors are
differently situated from domestic investors could be made. See Shay et al., supra note
9, at 115. Nevertheless, the fact that (almost) by definition earnings-stripping regimes
signal and penalize foreign investment strengthens the OECD’s position. These
institutional considerations could serve as a partial explanation for the endorsement
of the arm’s-length approach by many earnings-stripping regimes. This endorsement
is frequently manifested through exceptions provided to related-debt transactions that
are proven to be made on an arm’s-length basis (e.g., the case of Australia and
Germany earnings-stripping regimes), or by the incorporation of arm’s-length
benchmarks into the ratio formula (e.g., the U.S. earnings-stripping regime
(USESR)), as discussed below.
180
Nathan Boidman, Inversions, Earnings Stripping — Thin Capitalization and
Related Matters — An International Perspective, 29 TAX NOTES INT’L 879, 895–96, 904
(Feb. 24, 2003); Robert J. Misey, Jr., An Unsatisfactory Response to the International
Problem of Thin Capitalization: Can Regulations Save the Earnings Stripping
Provision?, 81 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 171, 202 (1990) (bringing to attention the
impact of re-characterization on related matters such as the computation of E&P in
the case of the United States).
181
Lars-Erik Wenehed, Thin Capitalization and EC Law, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L
1145, 1149 (May 26, 2003).
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creditor’s tax consequences under this approach, however, depend on
182
a number of additional factors. Assuming a constant limitation
amount, and putting aside differences arising from different
withholding tax rates on debt and equity, the tax consequences for the
debtor-corporate entity are similar under the disallowance and recharacterization regimes. In cases where there is more than one
shareholder, the burden of the additional source corporate tax liability
is borne not only by the shareholder providing the “illegitimate” loan,
183
but by all shareholders.
VI. THE USESR AS A CASE-STUDY: A CRITIQUE OF THE ANTIAVOIDANCE PHASE
A critical analysis of the USESR, as a case study, dovetails nicely
with the article’s historical analysis. First, the USESR subscribes to
the anti-avoidance paradigm in the sense that it tries to define, and
differentiate between, “illegitimate” (motivated by abusive tax
avoidance) and legitimate (debt) transactions. Second, it deals with
the primary problem manifested during the Anti-Avoidance Phase —
taxpayer ability to manipulate tax consequences through related party
transactions. Third, it deals with the source allocation consequences of
interest. Finally, the article maintains that the USESR is a reflection
of the anti-avoidance paradigm as a whole. It incorporates the notion
that the core difficulty with the IITR sourcing conventions is their
inability to deal with the transactional abusiveness associated with
cross-border related party activities. As the article demonstrates, this
notion is too narrowly framed and, paradoxically, even insufficient to
attain its own goals of coherently and equitably sourcing related party
182

These factors include, for example, the disparity between withholding taxes
laid on interest and dividends, the treatment of foreign sourced dividend by the
shareholder’s country of residence, the level of shareholder corporate integration, and
the classification of re-characterized related-debt transactions in which the lender is
the subsidiary.
183
In both cases, a similarly higher corporate tax is levied on the source level,
thus reducing the relative net worth of the holdings of (all) the debtor’s shareholders
(including those who are not considered related parties), rather than recouping the
revenue lost only from those shareholders engaged in the earnings-stripping. For
example, assume a corporation with two foreign shareholders each holding 50% of its
equity. One of the shareholders provides the corporation with a loan. Assume further
that some interest payments made under the shareholder’s loan are re-characterized
as dividends (or denied a deductions) under the earnings-stripping rules of the
corporation’s source jurisdiction. This will deny the deduction of those interest
payments and is thus likely to result in a higher corporate income tax liability that will
affect both shareholders.
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debt-finance transactions. The article’s focus on the IITR necessarily
dictates that the USESR’s implications on domestic tax-exempt
organizations be left out of the article’s discussion.
A. The USESR: Some Basic Operational Attributes
The 1945 U.S.-U.K. double taxation treaty was the first to
184
delineate an earnings-stripping regime. The current USESR is
defined in section 163(j) enacted in 1989. To fully understand the
inadequacies of the Anti-Avoidance Phase embedded in the USESR,
it is first important to understand its three main attributes.
1. Types of Debt Contracts Subject to the USESR
The USESR only limits the deductibility of what it defines as
185
“disqualified interest.” Disqualified interest is interest arising from
inbound debt investments made by controlling shareholders, which, in
186
the Code, are referred to as related parties.
The income is
“disqualified” only if the shareholders are exempt — in whole or in
187
part — from U.S. income taxation (including withholding taxes).
184

The Treaty established a basic earnings-stripping regime because its
negotiators acknowledged taxpayers’ ability to manipulate the discontinuity between
the withholding tax it laid on dividends and the exemption from withholding taxes on
interest. This earnings-stripping regime allowed both jurisdictions to limit the
exemption from withholding source taxes on interest in cases of affiliated lending
when the foreign creditor had a 50% voting interest in the debtor corporation. See
The Treaty, supra note 90, art. VII.
185
I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A).
186
I.R.C. § 163(j)(4)(A) (defining related parties as parties with at least 50%
ownership stake in the corporate (debtor) taxpayer); I.R.C. § 163(j)(4)(B)
(determining that while only corporations (and branches of corporate entities) could
be subjected as debtors to the USESR, partners could be considered as related
lenders); I.R.C. § 163(j)(5)(A) (containing rules for determining whether the interest
was subject to tax on the partner level); I.R.C. § 163(j)(4)(B)(i) (providing a de
minimis rule that does not disqualify a partnership that otherwise would be
considered a related person if less than 10% of the profits and capital interests are
held by a taxpayer not subject to U.S. tax); I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(C) (affiliated groups are
treated as a single taxpayer).
187
I.R.C. § 163(j)(3)(A). In cases in which treaties reduce but do not eliminate
withholding taxes, these reductions are treated as partial tax-exemptions. See I.R.C. §
163(j)(5)(B). Thus, the proportion of interest which is disqualified equals the
proportional reduction from the 30% withholding tax statutory rate. For example, if
through a double taxation treaty the withholding tax rate on interest was reduced to
10%, then two-thirds of the interest payments made by an American corporation to a
related foreign taxpayer would be disqualified.
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The USESR also covers interest arising from some related-debt
188
equivalents (e.g., debt guaranteed by related parties). It is important
to recognize that operating within this mandate limits the scope of the
USESR to consider only the appropriateness of intra-group debtfinance transactions. Therefore, it does not cover those cases in which
189
MNEs disproportionately leverage activities of (presumably highlytaxed) American subsidiaries with unrelated debt.
2. Defining (Fiscally) Inappropriate Debt Payments
To filter inappropriate related party debt transactions, the
USESR employs two safe-harbors: the debt-equity ratio and the
permissibility of interest deductions of up to 50% of adjusted taxable
income (the ATI Standard). Such a dual filtering system, of employing
ratio and (quasi) arm’s-length scrutiny standards jointly, situates the
190
USESR in the middle path between the two extremes. Interestingly,
both standards use corporate unrelated-debt or interest payments

188

The USESR is not restricted to apply only to direct related-debt transactions
but also extends to what may be coined “related-debt equivalents.” The relative
broadness by which the concept of relatedness is defined under the USESR is
manifested in the following respects: First, the benchmark of 50% ownership interest,
which lenders must have in order to be considered as related to the corporation, is
computed according to the related party rules. I.R.C. § 163(j)(4) (making a crossreference to sections 267(b) and 707(b)(1)). Second, the USESR recognizes indirect
(conduit) interest payments as disqualified interest. I.R.C. § 163(j)(3)(A) (using the
wording of “any interest paid or accrued by the taxpayer (directly or indirectly),” this
provision seems to be attentive to the ability to bypass the USESR by simple back-toback transactions (emphasis added)). In the absence of guiding earnings-stripping
regulations, this seems to be the only statutory anchor within section 163(j) to refute
the earnings-stripping potential of these types of transactions. Third, with a small
exception, the 1993 amendment of the USESR recognized interest payments arising
from debt guaranteed by a foreign related party as disqualified interest. I.R.C. §
163(j)(3)(B), (6)(D); I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(D)(ii) (contending that if the debtor has a
80%+ interest in the foreign guarantor then interest paid under the debt contract is
not disqualified). In my opinion, granting the section 163(j)(6)(D)(ii) exception is
wrong since it disregards the ability of a MNE to obtain deferral benefits and/or to
obtain stripping benefits through double stripping transactions. See also Sanford H.
Goldberg & Charles E. Valliere, Selected US Tax Developments: US EarningsStripping Rules Extended to Loans Guaranteed by Related Parties, 41 CAN. TAX J. 828,
831 (1993).
189
In comparison to the leverage applied to entities located in low-tax
jurisdictions.
190
Robert E. Culbertson & Jaime E. King, U.S. Rules on Earnings Stripping:
Background, Structure, and Treaty Interaction, 29 TAX NOTES INT’L 1161, 1169 (Mar.
24, 2003).
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(that typically enjoy per se legitimacy) as indicators to determine
whether the disqualified interest disallowance should be triggered.
First, deductions of any disqualified interest are unlimited so long
191
as taxpayer debt-equity ratios do not exceed a ratio of 1.5:1. This
192
comparatively low debt-equity ratio standard
means that only
companies from typically low-leveraged industries fall within the safe193
harbor provision. Thus, the safe-harbor allows taxpayers operating
in traditionally low-leveraged sectors (e.g., start-ups and retailers),
that are solely indebted to related parties, to fly well below the
USESR’s radar. On the other hand, the USESR may penalize other
taxpayers with relatively low percentages of related debt operating in
highly leveraged industries (e.g., manufacturing). As discussed later,
this blunts the USESR’s anti-abusive scrutiny blade.
Second, the deduction of disqualified interest is only limited to
194
the excess amount by which net interest expenses exceed 50% of the

191

I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)(ii), (C). The equity is computed with reference to the tax
base of corporate assets. I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(C)(i). Because of accelerated tax
depreciation, the emphasis on tax base reduces the value of the equity figure.
Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 654 (arguing that the safe-harbor would
apply mainly to corporations that are constantly engaged in purchasing assets).
192
Grant Richardson, Dean Hanlon & Les Nethercott, Thin Capitalization Rules:
An Anglo American Comparison, 24 INT’L TAX J. 36, 59 (1998).
193
For example, assume there are two corporations, both with a foreign
shareholder. The first corporation is a start-up in the internet communication
technology field. Since start-ups have the tendency of failing without leaving any
tangible assets for their creditors to claim, ordinary commercial lenders will be
reluctant to provide the start-up corporation with loans due to the enormous credit
risk it would involve. Any investor in the start-up will wish to compensate the risk it is
incurring with high rates of return, which are typically attained through equity or
hybrid financial investments and not through loans. The second corporation is an
industrial one operating in a well-established traditional sector. It requires substantial
preliminary investments, which in part would be financed by loans, since lenders can
better estimate its credit risk and could issue it recourse loans relying on its tangible
holdings. Thus, if the start-up corporation had a debt-equity ratio of 1.4:1, its interest
deductions would not be deferred under the USESR even if all of its loans were made
by related parties, though this would be considered a high leverage level for a startup. Additionally, if the industrial corporation had a 1.6:1 debt-equity ratio, it would
not fall under the safe-harbor even though this would be considered a low level of
leverage for this type of corporation. Furthermore, the industrial corporation will fail
to enter the safe-harbor even if only a small fraction of its debt was made by its
shareholders.
194
I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(B) (defining the term net interest expense as the excess of
interest expenses accrued during the fiscal year over the interest payments includable
in the taxpayer’s gross income in that year).
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195

adjusted taxable income (ATI). This link between the ATI and the
permissible level of interest deductions arises because the ATI is
196
considered a rough approximation of cash flow. Cash flow is widely
held to be the primary criterion by which unrelated lenders determine
197
the ability of potential debtors to service debt. Accordingly, the ATI
Standard is an indirect attempt to create a filtering mechanism that,
while using objective measurements, is sensitive to the type of
considerations taken by unrelated parties entering into debt
198
transactions. Since many taxpayers fail to meet the debt-equity safeharbor, much of the USESR’s ability to delineate a robust conception
of inappropriate related-debt financing practices hinges on the ATI
199
Standard’s operation.
3. Treatment of Inappropriate Debt Payments
The USESR limitation on the deduction of interest payments may
not exceed the lower of (1) the interest excess over the ATI Standard
or (2) the amount of recognized disqualified interest. Attentive to
business cycle volatility, the USESR employs a carryover provision
with no time limits. Thus, the USESR does not disallow interest
deductions but only defers them to future periods in which its net
interest deductions are less than the ATI Standard’s prescribed
200
amount.

195

I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)(i), (B). To avoid penalizing corporations with temporary
decline in revenues, the excess in interest expense may be reduced by offsetting it
with unused existing excess limitation carryforwards from three previous fiscal years.
See also I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(B)(iii) (the excess limitation is computed in a manner that
mirrors essentially the computation of excess interest expenses).
196
James E. Croker, Jr. & Henry J. Birnkrant, Earnings-Stripping Prop. Regs.
Raise the Level of Complexity for Related-Party Debt, 75 J. TAX’N 244, 245 (1991);
Harry L. Gutman, Thomas A. Stout, Jr., Paul M. Schmidt & Katherine Breaks,
KPMG Urges Reconsideration of Proposals Regarding Earnings-Stripping Provision,
2003 TNT 84-13 (2003). To entrench this approximation empirically, the USESR
provides a number of significant modifications to the way in which the adjusted
taxable income (ATI) is to be calculated by taxpayers (namely the add-backs of
depreciation amortization and depletion expenses). See I.R.C. § 163(j)(6)(A).
197
Croker, supra note 196, at 245–47.
198
Culbertson & King, supra note 190, at 1169.
199
Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 653–56.
200
I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(B). Along with the excess limitation, this interest deduction
deferment (until the taxpayer’s ATI justifies the deduction) provides taxpayers with
an averaging mechanism for USESR purposes.
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B. A Critical Analysis of the USESR
This Part engages in a critical assessment of the USESR’s
performance, through which it demonstrates that the anti-avoidance
paradigm’s objectives are a stopgap measure. As the result of its
failure to effectively define transactional legitimacy, the paradigm
offers no institutional salvage to the difficulties of sourcing affiliated
financial transactions in the face of complexity and abuse. I carve the
performance question into two analyses: (1) the effectiveness of the
USESR in protecting the corporate tax base from erosion and (2) its
ability to detect (and, as a byproduct, deter) abusive debt-finance
practices.
1. Lack of Effectiveness in Preventing the Tax Base Erosion
The ineffectiveness of the USESR in preventing corporate tax
base erosion arises from the carryover provisions and the ATI
Standard. First, as mentioned above, many believed that the ATI (as
an indicator of cash flow) provides a measure that correlates with the
201
corporate capacity to incur periodic interest payments. However,
202
the imperfections of the ATI Standard, along with taxpayer ability
to artificially maximize the ATI (without increasing taxable
203
income),
reduced the protective aptitude of this criterion. By
allowing corporations to deduct net interest expenses up to 50% of
ATI, the USESR permits profitable corporations to engage in high
levels of related leverage without being affected. Additionally, the
USESR’s emphasis on the ATI prescribes that corporations with high
levels of interest income, mainly financial institutions, are also
204
practically exempt from the USESR. The USESR’s impact on loss

201

Misey, supra note 180, at 199.
These imperfections, to a certain extent, could be attributed to the lack of
precise regulations.
203
Andrea Shaham-Mendell, Planning Alternatives to the Earnings Stripping
Provisions of Section 163(j), 70 TAXES 696, 700–01 (1992) (providing a number of
examples for how this may be attained such as buying an asset entitled to large
depreciation/amortization that will not only offset the income it produces but also
artificially increase the ATI, or investment in a diversified portfolio in which the
taxpayers will enjoy components that will be included in its ATI but not in its taxable
income (dividends subjected to dividend exemptions)); Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra
note 15, at 688–92 (providing a number of examples such as the purchase of assets
producing interest income as a technique that will provide the corporation with more
equity and more ATI — and which would allow it to reduce its net interest expenses).
204
Diana L. Wollman, Recent U.S. Earning Stripping Proposals: Why Were the
202
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corporations, which defer much of their interest deductions anyway, is
already limited. However, the USESR’s carryover arrangement also
severely limits its impact on companies with fluctuating ATIs, which
are able to deduct the differed disqualified interest deductions in
future years. All this essentially implies that the USESR has a very
limited scope and that it affects only a narrow group of mildly
profitable corporate taxpayers failing chronically to meet up to the
ATI Standard.
Second, the idea that the USESR was intended sincerely to
provide a buffer against U.S. corporate tax avoidance through high
leverage is in variance with the restrictive definition of disqualified
interest. By restricting its scrutiny to related debt (and debt
guaranteed by related parties) only, the USESR fails to respond to
major concerns over earnings-stripping practices involving
disproportionately high levels of leverage of MNEs’ American
subsidiaries. If one accepts that, economically, all the debt incurred by
205
an integrated MNE’s entities is supported jointly by all of its assets,
then the USESR does little to prevent MNEs from financing U.S.
operations through unrelated debt while financing operations in low206
tax jurisdictions through equity investments.
This problem of
disproportionate leverage has been identified as a major source of
207
concern by other tax regimes, as well as by recent bills that sought to
208
amend the USESR.
Discussions over the USESR erupted recently, in 2002, in light of
the relatively high number of corporate inversion transactions. These
involved replacements of American parent corporations with foreign
surrogates located in tax-havens with little or no impact on inverting
209
MNEs’ actual business.
Doctors Called and Is the Medicine Worse than the Disease?, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 483,
493 (May 5, 2003).
205
This premise is already supported by some Code sections. See infra note 226.
206
There is one significant exception to this, see supra note 188. The USESR
counters foreign disproportionate leverage when the American corporation’s debt to
an unrelated party is guaranteed by a foreign related person.
207
This is namely a concern of the Australian and New Zealand earningsstripping regimes. See Andrew M.C. Smith & Paul V. Dunmore, New Zealand’s Thin
Capitalization Rules and the Arm’s Length Principle, 57 BULL. INT’L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 503 (2003); Michael Wachtel, Australia’s New Thin Capitalization
Regime, 55 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 380 (2003).
208
Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals, 2003 TNT 23-11 (Feb. 3, 2003).
209
Desai & Hines, supra note 132 (analyzing the types and magnitudes of the tax
savings sought by inverting corporations); Hal Hicks, Overview of Inversion
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Inverting corporations sought long-term tax saving by avoiding
subpart F anti-deferral legislation and engaging in earnings-stripping
through injection of related party debt into former U.S. parents and
210
their subsidiaries. Inverted MNEs thus admitted openly (in SEC
filings and communications with shareholders) that they intended to
utilize the inversions not only to avoid paying U.S. taxes on foreign
earnings, but also to use earnings-stripping practices to avoid paying
taxes on U.S. source incomes. Moreover, it became evident that
invertors were trying to attain tax advantages blatantly possessed by
all (genuinely) foreign MNEs doing business in the United States
211
through subsidiaries.
In sum, the USESR does not alter incentives available to foreign
212
MNEs for leveraging U.S. subsidiary financing. Additionally, it is
incomplete, since it grants MNEs the ability to substitute related-debt
transactions with other types of related-capital funding transactions to
213
attain the same stripping effect. Most notably, the USESR fails to
address the issue of disproportionate leverage. In view of these
shortcomings, the USESR is an inadequate measure to prevent
corporate tax base erosion due to interest deductions.

Transactions: Selected Historical, Contemporary, and Transactional Perspectives, 30
TAX NOTES INT’L 899 (June 2, 2003) (providing an analysis of the main features of the
last wave of inversions).
210
Desai & Hines, supra note 132; Drawing Lines Around Corporate Inversion,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2270, 2278 (2005) (suggesting that the biannual revenue loss in
fiscal year 2002–2003 as a result of earnings-stripping by four inverting corporations
was estimated to be 700 million USD); Hicks, supra note 209, at 907, 915–16.
211
This initiated legislative proposals that eventually did not materialize into
legislation. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2896, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2003” 76–78
(Joint Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-72-03.pdf; STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., MODIFICATION FO THE CHAIRMAN’S
MARK ON THE “JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH (JOBS) ACT” 48 (Joint Comm.
Print 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-85-03.pdf; Andrew N. Berg,
NYSBA Comments on Proposals to Modify Earnings-Stripping Rules, 2003 TNT 17849 (Sept. 12, 2003) (providing a thorough discussion on the various legislatives
proposals to amend the USESR).
212
Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 675–76 (suggesting a model that
analyzes the incentives of different corporations to engage in related-debt financing
and demonstrating that the USESR really “hits” firms only in very remote scenarios).
213
Id. at 686 (discussing a number of examples (e.g., replacement of debt with
third party leases) and stressing that tax authorities will find it much more difficult to
challenge earnings-stripping techniques that do not depend on interest payments).
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2. The USESR’s Failure in Deterring Abusive Related-Debt
Transactions
Since tax base erosion is often a byproduct of successful
avoidance schemes, the article’s differentiation between the notions of
anti-avoidance and anti-erosion merits explanation. Although these
two topics are indivisible in many senses, there is a qualitative
difference of emphasis between them. While anti-erosion effects are
measured in terms of bottom-line revenue outcomes, the performance
of anti-avoidance mechanisms is measured by the USESR’s ability to
signal out technical attributes of transactions, which are structured in
a manner indicative of inappropriate tax avoidance motivations. This
distinction is useful because it explains why tax authorities often
combat certain types of practices while openly allowing others that
214
may have similar revenue effects.
Thus, the Anti-Avoidance Phase paradigm aimed to set a
behavioral standard for tax professionals regarding the limits of using
IITR’s incongruence for tax planning purposes. This type of
principled behavioral message is necessary, as a tax policy tool,
because of the infinite number of abuse and manipulation possibilities
contained in the Code. More specifically, in the context of related
transactions, this behavioral message is necessary to counter abuse
possibilities spawned by the inadequacies of the arm’s-length
214

For example, the Service has tried for many years to block treaty-shopping
practices through litigation and diplomacy. In 1987, the United States unilaterally
canceled its double taxation treaty with the Netherlands-Antilles, which for many
years was used as a loophole by American corporations that were trying to reduce
withholding taxes on their Eurobond borrowings. Convention Between the United
States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Neth., Aug. 8, 1986, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 6657 (expired
June 29, 1987).The double taxation treaty was revoked three years after the portfolio
tax exemption was made available to all U.S. corporations that wished to issue bonds
on the Eurobond markets. The distinction between anti-avoidance and anti-erosion
could explain the apparent policy inconsistency. While anti-erosion rationales would
have probably dictated the revocation of the double taxation treaty and the denial of
the exemption, anti-avoidance rationales would have only dictated the former. Antiavoidance rationales prescribe that the Netherlands-Antilles loophole should be
closed because it provided inverse incentives to engage in “dodgy” tax planning and
benefited those taxpayers willing to engage in manipulative conduit transactions. A
similar scenario may well be on its way right now. The Treasury and Congress have
spent considerable resources trying to counter corporate inversions, at precisely the
same time as there is a growing readiness to shift to a territorial tax system. I.R.C. §
7874.
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standard. By and large, the validity of the distinction between antiavoidance and anti-erosion rationales depends on one’s view as to
whether preventing taxpayer “self help” is a legitimate tax authority
objective. Anti-avoidance rationales aim to deter taxpayers from
exploiting certain tax reduction opportunities. Although some
(legitimate) tax reduction opportunities are available to all taxpayers,
the anti-avoidance paradigm seeks to deter and de-legitimize, yet not
criminalize, certain tax reduction opportunities. These opportunities
are distinguished by their availability only to well-advised and affluent
taxpayers. This provides a strong policy ground for supporting antiavoidance objectives, independent of anti-erosion rationales. Antiavoidance policy rationales may include democratic considerations
regarding the equitable distribution of the tax burden. More
profoundly, those policy rationales raise concerns with regard to the
prospects of yielding good tax policies through the democratic
process. Once tax avoidance practices afford affluent taxpayers a
lower tax burden, they have low incentives to mobilize or support a
215
tax reform process to yield superior alternatives.
The inquiry whether the USESR has successfully targeted abusive
related-debt finance transactions is rendered difficult by the
amorphousness of the anti-avoidance paradigm’s “inappropriateness”
standard. However, the article argues that the two safe-harbors
through which the USESR filters related-debt transactions provide an
unintuitive notion of “inappropriateness.”
First, the debt-equity safe-harbor is an arbitrary “golden panoply”
applied across the board to all industries. Derivatively, this prescribes
insensitivity to any “inappropriateness” in the tax avoidance
motivation of taxpayers operating in low-leveraged industries. Some
of these taxpayers can fall within the safe-harbor’s ambit, even
though, solely for tax reasons, a significant portion of their financing is
made through related party debts. One must note that tax
administration considerations may justify adopting a universal (rather
216
than an industry-specific) ratio. Despite these considerations, the
USESR debt-equity ratio still seems ill-suited to identify tax
avoidance motivation because of its reliance on both related and
unrelated debt. An attempt to root out transactions motivated by tax
215

Once most of the wealthy taxpayers are de facto exempt from a burdensome
tax arrangement (because of avoidance opportunities they can afford to employ),
there is likely to be less effective pressure on the political system to reform the
burdensome arrangement for the benefit of all taxpayers.
216
An industry-specific ratio will require defining different industry
classifications and will be more susceptible to lobby groups’ influence.
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avoidance mandates fixing a shareholder-specific (related) debtequity ratio. This ratio, which examines each related shareholders’
relative debt and equity interests in the debtor corporation, resonates
with specific (controlling) shareholder motivation to engage in
earnings-stripping much more so than a general debt-equity ratio.
Second, the ATI Standard’s operation as a filtering mechanism
mandates that highly profitable corporations, corporations with highgross interest income, and/or corporations operating in noncapitalintensive sectors, are in most cases beyond the reach of USESR
217
penalty. This is true even with corporations in which related debt is
a main avenue for finance. Furthermore, in many cases, the impact of
the USESR interest deduction limitation is determined according to
factors of profitability and cash flow (to the extent that both are
represented by the ATI). Both cash flow and profitability are highly
volatile, unpredictable, and dependent on many factors. Accordingly,
the linkage between the ATI Standard and abusive financing is in
many senses unclear. If a subsidiary is under-capitalized with respect
to equity-capital from its parent, there appears to be no policy
objective mandating that the interest deduction limitation be
implemented primarily in those periods when that corporation has a
low ATI.
An alternative line of criticism is that if the USESR intended to
deter tax avoidance transactions, it has done so in an over-inclusive
manner. As a crude unilateral mechanism applied across the board
against all related-debt transactions, the USESR may result in double
taxation of interest payments even if those payments lack avoidance
218
motivation, since they are made to high-tax jurisdiction creditors. If
the USESR genuinely intended to detect inappropriate avoidance
schemes, it would have probably taken into account the effective tax
rate on outbound interest payments in creditors’ residence
jurisdictions (thus imitating treaty base solutions that involve
219
limitation of withholding tax reductions).
This argument is
strengthened by the under representation of factors considered as
proxies for tax abusive intentions in the USESR. It leads to the
conclusion that the USESR fails to signal out, and therefore deter,
many avoidance motivated, inbound affiliated debt transactions.

217

Umbrecht & Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 659–61.
Boidman, supra note 180, at 903–04; Derek A. Burgess & James B.
Penlington, Earnings-Stripping Trap, 35 TAX ADVISER 545, 545 (2004).
219
Renfroe et al., supra note 72.
218
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C. The USESR’s Failure and the Limitations of the Anti-Avoidance
Paradigm
The analysis above suggests that the USESR’s quandaries arise
from the manner through which it perceives the problematic nature of
the earnings-stripping phenomenon. By exclusively associating the
earnings-stripping problem with narrowly defined related finance
transactions, the USESR exhibits much of the analytical flaws and
harmful consequences of the Anti-Avoidance Phase paradigm. As
mentioned previously, related debt is a legal fiction. Accordingly, the
USESR is problematic because of the constrained set of hypothetical
inquiries, limited by the arm’s-length standard, through which it
220
addresses this fiction (e.g., the ATI Standard).
Paradoxically, even if the arm’s-length standard could discern
what an unrelated party would have done, it is unclear whether that
would be sufficient to provide a normative framework upon which
inappropriate related debt should be defined. The idea that something
carried out by unrelated parties is per se appropriate when carried out
by related parties is undermined by the fact that many unrelated
parties prefer (for purely tax reasons) to package investments as debt
221
rather than equity. While this tendency may not be a problem in
itself, it begs the question whether the conduct of unrelated parties is
an adequate benchmark for assessing related transaction validity.
While affiliated-debt and unrelated transactions are subject to the
same favorable tax consequences, affiliated-debt transactions are not
truly subject to the high risks, especially credit risks, faced by
unrelated creditors.
This latter argument suggests that the attempt to dissect relateddebt earnings-stripping practices with arm’s-length standard scalpels
misses more than just the integrated manner by which financial
decisions are carried out within MNEs. It suggests that the
fundamental problem with the USESR, and the anti-avoidance
paradigm as a whole, is that it superficially distinguishes the issue of
how to deal with tax avoidance transactions from the broader
question of what the fair source return for (debt) investments should
be. It assumes wrongly that preventing avoidance schemes would be
sufficient to counter the harsh revenue impact of trade considerations
on IITR’s sourcing conventions.
220

Rosenbloom, supra note 154, at 27 (providing an elaborated upon discussion
regarding the role of hypothetical inquiries — with particular interest in the arm’slength standard).
221
Culbertson & King, supra note 190, at 1170.

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC

698

4/14/2008 12:05 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:631

It is first important to recognize that affiliated transactions do not
fundamentally alter the question of what should be the fair source
return for investments. Taxpayers’ attempts to run with the hares and
hunt with the hounds by retaining corporate control over subsidiaries
in high-tax jurisdictions while stripping their earnings into low-tax
jurisdictions through debt finance just highlight the fact that the
question remains unanswered. From the very beginning of the IITR,
the issue of source jurisdictions’ adequate return for debt investments
has never been resolved. As the article has demonstrated, this
vagueness is reflected in many sourcing arrangements. Earningsstripping practices are signaled out by the simple and lucrative
manner in which MNEs’ abuse this vagueness. This is one of the
article’s main points. It goes against the common wisdom among tax
scholars that the problem of sourcing related transactions is insulated
from other pending sourcing difficulties in the IITR. The article
acknowledges that the growing volumes of affiliated transactions in
the last quarter century have altered materially the economic
infrastructure to which the IITR relates, but points out that the origins
of the difficulty in sourcing affiliated transactions are rooted more
deeply in the historical development of sourcing conventions.
It is noteworthy that MNEs’ ability to disproportionately leverage
business activities in high-taxed jurisdictions proves that the potential
of corporate income tax base erosion lies in affiliated settings — not
exclusively in the tendency to shift income through affiliated
222
transactions. Any future policy aiming to counter source base
erosion tendencies should, therefore, go beyond the issue of pricing
affiliated financial transactions and aim to provide a comprehensive
solution of sourcing affiliated financial settings.
On a more abstract level, MNEs’ ability to utilize tax-competitive
environments to report income in low-tax jurisdictions eradicates the
fig leaf covering the reciprocal nature of withholding tax reductions.
The theory behind those reductions assumes that they help residence
jurisdictions collect more revenues. However, the tax sensitive finance
structures of MNEs refute the idea that reducing withholding taxes on
debt financing results in a win-win situation for all nations (and
taxpayers) involved. Such tax structures vindicate the Revenue

222

Evidence of the importance of this issue can be observed by some of the
recent changes in the new anti-earnings-striping regimes (in Australia, New Zealand,
and Germany), as well as the recent attempt of the Bush administration to change the
USESR (which also targeted the problem of disproportionate leverage). See supra
note 207 and 208.
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Phase’s initial insight: that allocation of tax is, to a large extent, a zero
sum game among different nations and investors.
In many respects, the nonoptimal operation of the USESR could
be attributed to its design as a crude backup to an amalgam of Trade
Phase loopholes. Thus, rather than theorizing a legitimacy benchmark
for affiliated-debt investments, the USESR’s cumbersome operation
sought a crude (and remote) last line of defense against: (1) the
difficulties in distinguishing between debt and equity in light of their
often similar economic function and materially different tax
consequences; (2) the imperfections of anti-treaty-shopping treaty
arrangements; and, most importantly, (3) the practical and theoretical
deficiencies of the arm’s-length standard in sourcing affiliated
financial transactions. If one accepts this account, then one can only
wonder why arm’s-length proxies were embedded in the USESR in
the first place.
The anti-avoidance paradigm of the USESR is subject to criticism
not only for its low revenue yields, but also for infringing fundamental
223
institutional constraints undertaken by the treaty network. Some of
its critics consider the USESR to be inherently unfair, since it (1)
unilaterally alters U.S. treaty obligations to address a problem that
could have been addressed properly through treaty negotiations, and,
in the case of more than one shareholder, (2) lays a tax burden on
parties other than shareholders engaged in earnings-stripping tax
224
avoidance practices.
I respectfully disagree with the above line of criticism. In my
opinion, there is a qualitative difference between the earningsstripping regimes’ attempt to cap tax reduction by limiting abusive
affiliated transactions and the overriding of treaty obligations.
Treaties’ main objective is to facilitate a tax environment supportive
of a broad array of cross-border transactions, not to prevent specific
tax avoidance transactions. Accordingly, as a matter of public policy
and treaty interpretation, it seems most plausible to argue that specific
anti-avoidance arrangements should be left to national legislators.
It is nevertheless important to recognize that the incorporation of
the anti-avoidance rationale within the USESR positioned it in the
223

Throughout the different stages of its development, the USESR was criticized
for being a “cheating” mechanism intended to override U.S. treaty obligations. See
Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides: A Call to Action, 62 U. PITT. L.
REV. 677, 682, 687–88 (2001) (claiming that the USESR is one of many overrides that
are unfair, creates uncertainty, and harms U.S. reputation, thereby deterring other
countries from entering into treaties with it); Roin, supra note 130, at 275–78.
224
Roin, supra note 130, at 289, 295.
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crossfire of criticism from both sides of the barricade. Failing to
restore effective fiscal sovereignty over mobile resources, the USESR
is rumored to be wasteful, complicated, arbitrary, and ineffective. On
the other hand, traversing the twilight zone of breaching treaties’
(Trade Phase) anti-discrimination obligations, others criticize the
225
USESR for its discriminatory nature. Perhaps more than anything,
the position of tax authorities, situated between the devil and the deep
blue sea in the earnings-stripping context, is the prime example of the
Anti-Avoidance Phase moral. The quest pursued by policymakers in
the Anti-Avoidance Phase, to remedy Trade Phase tax erosion by
identifying transactional attributes that render tax schemes
inequitable, is futile. Mired in its practical and conceptual drawbacks,
the anti-avoidance theme was (and still is) unable to offer a viable
alternative to the (Trade Phase’s) status quo, let alone to dispel it.
VII. AN EPILOGUE AND A PROLOGUE
A. An Epilogue
The story of the IITR has not yet been articulated. To the extent
that it has, it was often portrayed (simplistically) as sagas of the north
disinvesting the south of revenues, or as a story of policymakers’
capture. Through the example of the erosion of source taxes on
inbound interest income, the article offers a profound and novel view
suggesting that the history of sourcing is a history contoured by
dominant business interests and policymakers’ myopia.
As the developed world emerged from WWI into the Revenue
Phase, the major problem, requiring the establishment of the IITR,
was how to assure credible double taxation reduction in the face of
mounting national needs for both tax revenue and foreign investment.
The finalization of the League’s three draft conventions in 1928, each
pursuing different sourcing doctrines, marks the capital-importing
countries’ failure to establish a cartelized arrangement that
guaranteed a minimal level of source return. The League’s failure to
elicit a set of allocation — rather than coordination — IITR sourcing
norms sparked the tax-competitive harmonization of source taxes.
This process was most visible with regard to the reductions of source
withholding tax rates on interest income during the Trade Phase.
The Trade Phase began at the end of WWII when the main
problem facing Western countries was how to structure an IITR that
225

George B. Delta, The New Earning Stripping Provision, 31 TAX MGM’T MEM.
87, 91–92 (1990).
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did not get in the way of inducing foreign trade. This stipulated
objective aligned well with the broader political agenda of the time —
to strengthen Western economies. This trade agenda endorsed the
harmonization of withholding tax reduction. However, what began as
a set of cautious treaty-based, reciprocal reductions in withholding
taxes in the early days of the Trade Phase became, towards the mid1980s, a tooth and nail tax-competitive war for foreign investment (as
exemplified in portfolio income exemptions). If, at the beginning of
this process, it was believed that lower source taxation resulted in
higher residency revenues, that conviction proved a false promise. It
further became evident that even dominantly positioned countries
such as the United States were not immune from the displeasing
revenue consequences of a source tax-competitive battle for foreign
investment.
During the Anti-Avoidance Phase — to date, the last episode in
this saga — nations recognized that (in light of growing obligations)
the ongoing erosion of their income tax base was the major problem
for the IITR. More specifically, they recognized that new dominant
MNE actors in the global economy are able to exploit many of the
IITR’s imperfections and incongruence to reduce tax liabilities. In
response, governments attempted to amend the IITR to reverse tax
erosion by promoting the concept of anti-avoidance, which aimed to
filter legitimate from illegitimate transactions. The anti-avoidance
paradigm was, nevertheless, a failure. Divisible, tax authorities do not
have the enforcement resources to comprehensively audit the many
Goliaths of an integrating global economy; nor do they have the
conceptual foundations needed to coherently identify illegitimate
transactions.
The IITR was able to perform relatively well as long as crossborder investments were FDIs made by foreign investors that were
operationally distinguishable from the foreign corporations in which
they invested. This also has to do with the imposition of residual
residence taxes on foreign investors, which limited the rewards of
source manipulation abuse. These premises acutely contrast with
contemporary international cross-border investments, which involve
increasing volumes of portfolio and affiliated investments, MNEs’
enhanced integration, and sovereigns’ growing inability and
unwillingness to enforce residence taxation on MNEs. An aching
fiscal void is therefore bound to materialize.
Upon scrutiny, another pattern that emerges from this problemand-reaction history is an ongoing shift of the institutional frameworks
in search of solutions. During the Revenue Phase, delineation of IITR

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.7.DOC

702

4/14/2008 12:05 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:631

sourcing conventions took place, primarily, on a multilateral level as
the League attempted to establish agreed upon sourcing conventions.
By the Trade Phase, the center of gravity shifted from multilateral to
bilateral settings. This phase was marked by the impact of the Treaty,
and the treaties that followed it, which attenuated the importance of
multilateral arrangements (e.g., the model treaties). Though still
significant for coordinating IITR norms, such multilateral institutional
arrangements no longer serve as the trailblazers of the IITR. To some,
it may seem as if, in many cases, the international arrangements have
tended to follow the footsteps of norms established on the bilateral
treaty network level, rather than originating these norms themselves.
Towards the end of the Trade Phase and the beginning of the AntiAvoidance Phase, the center of gravity shifted again from the bilateral
to the unilateral level, as nations began to both unilaterally compete
for investments by reducing taxes and to prevent erosion by
establishing unilateral anti-avoidance mechanisms.
This change in the IITR’s institutional framework reflects a
profounder development in the underlying tax allocation conflict that
mobilized IITR policymakers in the different Phases. During the
Revenue Phase and the beginning of the Trade Phase the underlying
conflict was the allocation of revenues between capital-exporting
countries and capital-importing countries. However, towards the end
of the Trade Phase this distinction between capital-exporting and
capital-importing countries became obscure. Hence, by the end of the
Trade Phase the allocation problem transformed from being a
problem of allocating revenues between different countries to an
allocation conflict between sovereigns and international investors,
primarily MNEs. Uncoordinated, countries tried, unilaterally and
unsuccessfully, to advance a multi-objective tax policy of attracting
foreign investments and countering avoidance.
To the extent that this is the end of the story, then the ending is
not a happy one. Divided, nations are ruled by sourcing conventions
that originated years ago in response to business sector pressures.
During the last eight decades, policymakers and scholars failed to
anchor these conventions to any normative content that allowed
sovereigns to structure durable IITR sourcing regimes. This is a major
reason for concern due to the growing readiness among policymakers,
in different jurisdictions, to shift to territorial tax regimes. If such a
change indeed occurs, an alteration or elimination will likely occur to
226
many of the residency safeguards on source stripping. This will bring
226

Section 864(e), (f) allocates some of the U.S. corporation’s interest deductions
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IITR’s sourcing conventions to the fore, forcing policymakers to deal
directly with the challenges of allocating income between sovereigns.
The article’s analysis questions whether these conventions are apt to
meet such a heavy burden.
B. A Prologue
Some indicators suggest new movements in the IITR
policymaking regarding interest income sourcing conventions. Recent
227
proposals to change the USESR, and changes in other earnings228
stripping regimes around the world, indicate that the IITR may be
on the edge of a new Allocation Phase with regard to sourcing interest
income. While no allocation doctrine has yet been delineated, those
indicators suggest policymakers’ growing readiness to reconceptualize earnings-stripping regimes to disregard some of the
fundamental cornerstones of the anti-avoidance approach. These
earnings-stripping regimes base their interest disallowance rules on
criteria that fail to distinguish between related and unrelated debt and
foreign and domestic debt.
A thorough discussion of these changes and the delineation of an
alternative IITR sourcing regime are beyond the scope of this article.
The need for a re-conceptualization of sourcing conventions is not
self-evident. It may be the case that other tax bases (e.g., consumption
or wage) will replace eventually the income base over the course of
the 21st century. However, to the extent one believes in the
maintenance of the income tax base, then in an integrating global
economy, this requires a more robust set of sourcing conventions. A
different study dealing with the principle features to which the
Allocation Phase should evolve will address whether these
developments do indeed mark a new phase in IITR sourcing
against its foreign income to determine its maximum credit through an asset based
formula. The effectiveness of this safeguard over the ability of U.S. tax resident
MNEs to deduct interest payments against their U.S. sourced income may be reduced
significantly in the case of a shift to a territorial system. This is because more of the
income repatriating will take the form of exempt dividends rather than sale, royalty,
and interest transactions that would still be subject to U.S. tax.
227
Boidman, supra note 180.
228
Markus Ernst, Toward a Level Playing Field for Thin Capitalization: German
and U.S. Approaches, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 657 (Aug. 21, 2006) (discussing section 8a
of the German Corporate Income Tax Code (Körperschaftsteuergesetz — KStG));
Richardson, Hanlon & Nethercott, supra note 192, at 50 (discussing the Australian
and New Zealand earnings-stripping regimes); Smith & Dunmore, supra note 207
(discussing the 1996 New Zealand earnings-stripping regime).
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conventions. To efficiently source the proceeds of mobile financial
investments, the sourcing conventions of this emerging phase will
have to depart from the current prevalent classifications. Most
notably, IITR conventions should depart from correlating the
distinction between the abuse potential of affiliated and nonaffiliated
transactions with that between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Instead,
the sourcing conventions should distinguish between evasion
prevention measures and a much more comprehensive set of
formulary sourcing measures for assuring proper allocations of
income derived by MNEs from (related and unrelated) financial
transactions and assets.
The article elaborates briefly on the principled axis of such a
229
regime. Creating this principled basis is the first step in offering a
viable alternative to the current amalgam of IITR’s arrangements
(during its formulation in the Anti-Avoidance and Trade Phases).
Others should view this principled basis as the inevitable conclusion of
the article’s criticism of the IITR’s historical development presented
throughout the analysis.
The first theme that emerges from the article’s historical analysis
is that one of the major challenges facing the Allocation Phase will be
to delineate the institutional framework in which the IITR sourcing
conventions should develop. Such a comprehensive framework should
seek to provide better sourcing arrangements on the unilateral,
multilateral, and (most importantly) bilateral levels. Since unilateral
arrangements seem almost categorically insufficient and robust
multilateral IITR sourcing arrangements considered almost utopian,
the first principle of reform would have to address the substantive
features of treaties and the manner by which they are formulated.
This is not a simple task since, as the article has shown, the treaties’
decentralized network and flexible evolution came at the cost of a
very cumbersome, over formalistic, obsolete, and incoherent body of
230
law — one that is extremely difficult to negotiate and amend.

229

Bird, supra note 66, at 756.
Tillinghast, supra note 81, at 455–57. The article mentions the following key
points: (1) Treaties “are incredibly slow-moving creatures. They are time-consuming
to negotiate and impossible to update on a regular basis”; (2) “The concepts
embodied in the existing tax treaties . . . were largely conceived in the days of a ‘brickand-mortar’ industrial economy. . . . [for example] [r]ules designed to apply to the
physical delivery of tangible goods or the provision of physical labor . . . do not always
work well when applied to the delivery of software or on-line services. . . . the use of
derivative financial instruments to bundle or unbundled economic interests,
synthesize securities or confer the economic equivalent of the ownership of property
230
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Furthermore, the treaties’ bilateral framework created many of the
IITR’s structural anomalies because of its inability to encompass the
231
This is most
multi-jurisdictional aspects of many transactions.
evident in the taxation of MNEs, in which the treaties’ bilateral
232
solution spawns numerous tax avoidance opportunities. Moreover,
lacking any normative base, the patchwork of treaties seemed to
encourage and even legitimize trends of taxpayers’ tax avoidance and
sovereigns’ tax competition. However, the article’s analysis also
stresses that treaties may, nevertheless, be a wise policy alternative in
233
a reality in which no multilateral tax agreement is foreseeable. In a
world of low international tax cooperation, the outcomes of coherent
and “correct” unilateral policies are likely to be turbulent and
unpredictable, even if framed by competent and benevolent
234
policymakers. Accordingly, at least in the short run, policymakers
and academics should internalize “proper” sourcing arrangements in
the treaty practice so as to make use of this powerful policymaking
tool.
The second and third principles emerge from the analysis of the
USESR and its operation in post Trade Phase circumstances of low
withholding taxes and weak notions of residency taxation. The second
principle hence requires a change in the IITR’s emphasis from the
classical shareholder corporate distinction to a related (transaction)

without actually transferring that ownership raises treaty issues that require
resolution”; and (3) Treaties’ distinction between debt and equity, for the purposes of
withholding source taxes, is somewhat inconsistent with the exemption of income
arising from derivative financial instruments. Id. These instruments could be used to
create financial positions, which are equivalent to ownership over debt and equity
resources.
231
Since it affects states that are not contracting parties to the bilateral treaty as
well as other bilateral treaty obligations of the contracting states, no bilaterallyagreed MNE taxation policy is likely to be systematically and comprehensively
applied. This is true for the following reasons: First, no bilateral agreement can
retroactively control provisions of former agreements made by either state, nor can
one state adequately constrain the ability of another state from later entering into
different treaty obligations. Second, a bilateral treaty cannot constrain the actions of
third party states that, in a tax competitive environment, are likely to try to undercut
any bilateral MNE tax policy in order to improve their own revenue collection.
232
Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1641, 1641–43 (2001); Whisenhunt, supra note 59, at 546–47.
233
Lebovitz & Seto, supra note 80, at 530.
234
Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of
Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54
TAX L. REV. 353, 408 (2001).
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235

and nonrelated (transactions/corporate-setting) emphasis. This new
emphasis should not aim to offer different anti-avoidance standards
for related transactions. It should rather try to offer a categorical shift
in how tax authorities perceive and tax MNEs. The emphasis on the
distinction between affiliated and nonaffiliated transactions is a
practical, rather than a conceptual, distinction. It is triggered by the
harsh revenue implications of failing to tax MNEs and is therefore a
natural upshot of the arm’s-length standard’s deficiencies. This article
highlights this by questioning the validity of debt financing in
affiliated settings where there is no “natural rivalry” between
contractual parties to assure the integrity of the underlying
transactions.
The third, and perhaps most imperative, principle stresses that
any sourcing regime of financial income will have to bridge some of
the USESR’s discontinuities that emerge from capital’s fungiblity. As
in other cases involving the taxation of financial instruments,
discontinuities in the tax treatment of similar transactions arise
because MNEs control the tax consequences of their financial flows
within affiliated settings by engaging in financial engineering
techniques to break, synthesize, re-package, and hybridize the legal
form of their financial assets. They make use of this ability to
manipulate between economically equivalent transactions to attain
the most favorable tax result. Thus, MNEs are able to skew,
contractually, the risks from the income and deductions associated
with the holdings of their financial assets between their various
subsidiaries. By striping the earnings of their subsidiaries located in
high-tax jurisdictions, MNEs erode the source corporate tax base in
those jurisdictions. In an era where international commerce and the
role of MNEs in it are steadily growing, MNEs’ avoidance of source
corporate income taxes is a serious threat to the integrity of the
income tax. To deal with this problem, policymakers are required to
disregard the legal form of MNEs’ internal financial flows. This
requires tax authorities to establish alternative methods to allocate
MNEs’ financial income on a net basis of the MNE as a whole and not
to try and allocate the financial income of every one of its subsidiaries.
Put differently, MNEs’ resiliency in re-classifying and re-assigning
financial assets between their subsidiaries requires tax authorities to
235

Ault, supra note 11, at 569 (“[The OECD Model Treaty] recognizes the
separate right of the source state to tax dividend income in the hands of the investor
after imposing a corporate level tax on the profits from which the dividend is paid, as
well as the right of the residence country to tax, after giving the appropriate double
tax relief for the shareholder-level tax.”).
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compute their “financial income” only with regard to financial
contracts with unaffiliated parties. More specifically, this prescribes
(1) a combined encapsulation of the earnings-stripping and the
disproportionate leverage phenomena, (2) the elimination of the
distinction between foreign and domestic debt, and (3) the elimination
of any discontinuity in the tax treatment of debt/equity. This
essentially entails some type of quasi-unitary consolidation of MNEs’
financial earnings and an appropriation formula to source them.
The forth principle emerges from the article’s emphasis on the
growing tendencies of tax evasion associated with portfolio
investment. This principle suggests the need for more robust and
efficient information sharing measures to assure residence tax on the
proceeds of these investments.
The present article lays out the platform for this advanced
assessment, along with the treaty and statutory reform proposals it
entails.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The interest income sourcing problem is both intriguing and
important because it unfolds many core issues that influenced the
development of the IITR. The original sin was the differential
(domestic) tax treatment of debt and equity investments under
classical corporate taxation. That problem was magnified as the
income tax techniques used to tax and allocate the proceeds of
international transactions employed different source tax treatments
for debt and equity investments. In terms of revenues, and because
MNEs may exploit jurisdictional mismatches through related setting
manipulations, leaving these problems unsolved entails high stakes.
Moreover, formulating a robust and well theorized set of sourcing
conventions for financial investments is an acute necessity as the
winds of change calling for territoriality develop.
The derivative of this article’s analysis is the following: tax
policymakers and academics face two important tasks with regard to
the source tax treatment of income from financial investments. First,
on the conceptual level, a well theorized notion of source precedent in
levying income taxes, as well as an inquiry as to what comprises a “fair
(source) return” for debt investments, must be established.
Second, on a more practical level, a mechanism that re-imposes
national fiscal sovereignty on MNEs using affiliated settings to exploit
jurisdictional mismatches, as well as to avoid source taxation, must be
devised.
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Addressing both objectives is feasible and should be pursued as
the IITR advances into a novel Allocation Phase in the coming
decades.

